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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2015 Saudi Arabian women were for the first time in history granted political 
space through electoral suffrage. To evaluate whether the new political opening for Saudi 
Arabian women has improved women’s rights and equality in the Kingdom, I sought to 
conduct interviews to acquire their views and attitudes. In the process my encounters with 
Saudi Arabian women revealed their fear, cautiousness, and unwillingness to participate 
politically, which impelled me to discover the relationship between women’s political 
participation and political repression. In the course of this research I learned that political 
repression inhibits women’s political participation, and in Saudi Arabia women remain 
voiceless despite the new political space – political participation did not account for 
political freedoms. This thesis provides analysis of the relationship by demonstrating the 
prevalence of Saudi Arabian women’s lack of freedom in political participation.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Democratization theorists suggest that women’s active and direct participation in 
the realm of politics and governance will lead to regime transition, allowing women to 
participate in the political realm to improve women’s political status. Generally, new 
democracies are emerging across the globe and there exists a considerable growth. This is 
due to the fact that civil society perceives democracy as the only system of governance 
capable of initiating the rule of law, economic justice, and political inclusivity (Svolik 
2008). However, in reality all countries are democratic in their own peculiar ways, thus 
democracies across the world are far from identical (Svolik 2008). One way to achieve 
democracy as suggested by scholars in academia is through political inclusivity, which 
implies women’s representation in the political arena and electoral suffrage. Since the 
late 1800s, women around the world have been actively advancing women’s rights to 
political suffrage (Henderson and Jeydal 2007, 7-8). The first country that expanded the 
right to vote to women was New Zealand in 1893, followed by Australia in 1902, Finland 
in 1906, and Norway in 1913. Denmark and Iceland allowed women to vote and stand in 
elections in 1915, and the United States followed in the 1920s. Subsequently, during 
World War I (1914-1918) fifteen countries approved women’s suffrage, and in the period 
of World War II (1939-1945) thirteen countries allowed women to vote (Women’s 
Suffrage 2016). Currently, there are 193 countries that have approved women’s right to 
suffrage and the right to stand for elections. The one country that has not done so is 
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Brunei; an absolute monarchy, Brunei is an outlier because it has prohibited citizens’ 
political participation since 1962. Several countries have underlined certain restrictions 
indicating the type of office women are permitted to stand for in elections, thus 
conditioning women’s access to political arena. Guyana allows women to sit on the 
British Guiana Legislative Council, while Japan permits women to stand for elections 
only for the House of Councilors (Women Suffrage and Beyond 2015). Following in the 
footsteps of the Western nations, Middle Eastern nations have also extended suffrage to 
women. For example, Lebanon extended suffrage to women in 1952, Syria in 1953, 
Egypt in 1956, and Tunisia in 1959. In subsequent years followed by Iran in 1963, Libya 
in 1964, Yemen in 1970, Jordon in 1974, Iraq in 1980 and finally, Kuwait in 2005 
(Women’s Suffrage 2016). Since then, to some extent, the presence of women in the 
political realm has become evident across Middle Eastern nations as well. Middle Eastern 
women are actively participating in governance, pursuing leadership positions, and 
becoming more vocal in regards to taboo or sensitive issues (Alhamad 2008, 38).  
Scholars of democracy have proposed that extension of political participation 
takes place and becomes the strongest when women’s civil society meets three 
conditions:  autonomy from the regime, a prodemocracy agenda, and the capacity for 
building political coalitions with other social sectors. Even though civil society is present 
across countries in the Middle East, due to regime oversight activities of civil society 
remain circumscribed. Most of the governments of the Middle East establish a range of 
bureaucratic mechanisms in order to curtail activism of pro-women or pro-human rights 
organizations. Thus, such organizations become an instrument of state social control 
rather than a “mechanism of collective action” (Wiktorowicz 2000, 43). In Kuwait non-
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governmental organizations are highly dependent upon the government’s financial 
assistance. In Jordan, legislation prohibits social organizations from interfering or 
engaging in the political realm. In Morocco, civic organizations are numerous in number 
but lack power to pressure the King to implement reforms (Choucair-Vizoso 2008, 268). 
Despite Arab citizens’ support for democracy and will to achieve political reforms, 
democracy is slow to reach the Middle East. Back in 2010, the authoritarian leaders of 
the Middle East for the first time witnessed a series of demonstrations from populations 
demanding political reforms across Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, 
Kuwait and Syria. The encouraging signs of the revolutionary Arab Spring uprisings 
resulted, however, in just the single successful case of Tunisia, which achieved 
consolidated democracy after the overthrow of the authoritarian regime. Hence, 
democratic systems of governance are difficult to achieve especially in the climate of 
exaggerated expectations. One way to achieve democracy is through the implementation 
of a set of institutions that could provide for accountability and transparency, but this 
requires the support of the political elite and the citizens (O’Donell and Schmitter 1986, 
425). 
The authoritarian regimes of the Middle East are adaptive towards Western 
pressures that push for democratization. Authoritarian states make concessions granting 
women political participation without actual institutional transformation. Institutional 
transformation occurs when strong, independent institutions that could ensure 
accountability and transparency replace traditional neo-patrimonial institutions. In the 
absence of institutional transformation, appointment of women to political positions takes 
place through clientelistic linkages; in other words, female candidates may obtain seats 
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through personal connections rather than based on merit or talent (Awad 2013, 275). 
Thus political positions are distributed to elite women from the circle of regime 
supporters. Accordingly, authoritarian states in the Middle East have enacted a series of 
political reforms that were administered through the top-down approach, without the 
intention of actual power consolidation (Ottaway and Riley 2008, 185). The political 
power remains concentrated in the hands of regime loyalists. When leaders of Arab states 
create political institutions, such institutions remain accountable to the leaders rather than 
to the people; leaders control these institutions. Therefore, today, many Arab countries 
depict democracies and hold frequent competitive elections without truly democratizing. 
Morocco and Kuwait are the most liberalized and democratized countries that have 
implemented competitive elections, with public debates, media campaigns and 
“reasonable” individual freedoms, yet the leader’s power is disproportionately larger than 
the parliamentarians (Ottaway and Riley 2008, 182). Similarly, the Jordanian monarchy 
retains complete authority over the political arena and the “institutions accountable to the 
electorate” (Choucair-Vizoso 2008, 46). King Abdullah II of Jordan has continued to 
repress political and civil liberties, while intensifying the power of the secret police 
forces, despite the promises made to the international community. In 2001, the King 
stipulated under the 211 provisional law that citizens engaging in public gatherings, 
meetings, and rallies without the government’s consent would receive penalties in the 
form of imprisonments or fines (Choucair-Vizoso 2008, 53). This shows that even though 
authoritarian regimes grant political space for women, they do not guarantee structural 
reforms – women hold no actual power that could facilitate a positive impact. 
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The authoritarian government of Saudi Arabia took a stand in favor of Saudi 
Arabian women by implementing democratic reform; i.e., it granted women the right to 
political participation. In the past, the government of Saudi Arabia continuously 
condemned women’s struggle for political participation by justifying its incompatibility 
with cultural-religious rhetoric. However, on September 25, 2011 under discretion of 
King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud (who ruled between 2005-2015), the government 
of Saudi Arabia made a bold step towards women’s inclusivity in the political arena 
(MacFarquhar 2011). In light of United Nations Resolution 1325 – which advocates for 
women’s inclusivity across the economic, social and political realms of the state and 
encourages governments to broaden women’s participation – the government of Saudi 
Arabia allowed women the right to vote and run for the 2015 Municipal Council 
elections. The King in his public statement declared:  
We refuse to marginalize women in society in all roles that comply with Shar’ia, we 
have decided, after deliberation with our senior ulema (clerics) and others…to involve 
women in the Shura Council as members, starting from the next term. Women will be 
able to run as candidates in the Municipal Elections and will even have a right to vote 
(Al Arabiya, September 25, 2011).  
 
There are 13 provinces with 285 Municipal Councils that are enlisted with 
advisory powers. In October 2003, King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (who ruled 1982-
2005) granted an opportunity for Saudi Arabian males to have a role in political apparatus 
through the Municipal Council elections, in which half of the candidates were 
democratically elected and the other half appointed by the King. Since then these 
elections have been conducted every four years. In total there are 1,636 council members 
of which half (818) are appointed by the Ministry of the Municipal and Rural Affairs and 
the other half are elected. The members of Municipal Council elect a chairman and a 
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deputy through voting that takes place every two years. The power of the Municipal 
Councils remains limited, as it serves as an advisory agency to the King that covers issues 
ranging from political reform, environmental sustainability, provision of public services, 
and unemployment (My Country Campaign 2015). Even though the Municipal Councils 
are enlisted with advisory power – i.e. the Councilors are unable to initiate legislation and 
can only draft a potential legislation for the King – this is a great step for the future of 
women’s empowerment and equality in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Considering the 
ongoing generational struggles Saudi Arabian women faced in the past and strong 
cultural sentiments against women’s political aspirations, it was unthinkable that women 
would be finally granted an opportunity to participate politically. Political participation in 
the Municipal Councils could grant women not only a presence but also a voice – a voice 
that could open doors for a political debate. In the 2015 elections seventeen women 
winners secured seats; these include four women in Jeddah, one in the district of Mecca, 
and the rest in Tabuk, Ahsaa, and Qatif (Black 2015). About 900 Saudi Arabian women 
competed against 6,000 men for seats in 285 local Municipal Councils (AlJazeera, 
December 14, 2015). The voter turnout was estimated to be about 25 percent, which is 
considered low for a country’s first experience with democratic elections. In total there 
were 1.32 million men and 130,000 women who showed up to the polling stations to 
register their vote for their preferred candidates. Whether Saudi Arabian citizens were 
unfamiliar or unwilling to participate in the electoral process still remains unclear (Black 
2015). 
The international media viewed Saudi Arabian women’s political participation “as 
an incremental but significant opening for Saudi women to play an equal role in Saudi 
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Arabian society” (CBS News, December 25, 2015). The US State Department applauded 
the Saudi Arabian government and praised the Kingdom for the inclusion of women in 
elections. John Kirby, the US State Department Spokesperson, stated:  
…The participation of women represents an important step forward in Saudi Arabia 
toward a more inclusive electoral process that will ensure all citizens are represented 
in a government accountable to all Saudi citizens… as we have long said, the inclusion 
of all citizens in voting and governance is critical to the prosperity, stability, and peace 
of all nations, and we welcome this historic milestone (Kirby 2015). 
 
However, the political concessions granted to women raised debate among Saudi 
Arabian women themselves. Some women such as Aziza Youssef, a women’s rights 
advocate, created a campaign to boycott the elections. In her view, Municipal Council 
Elections pushed the Saudi Arabian women’s pro-rights movement backward. “This 
election is just – it’s for the West it’s not for us… It’s good for our picture in the West” 
(NPR News, December 19, 2015). Conversely, many Saudi Arabian women cheered their 
victory hoping for greater space in the public arena, as they believed that women’s 
political suffrage is beneficial for the wellbeing of Saudi Arabian women and the first 
step in achieving a greater equality in the Kingdom (NPR News, December 19, 2015). 
According to a professor of women’s studies at the King Saud University, Hatoon al-
Fassi, “women securing local positions is important… because women could change 
many discriminatory rules that deals with women’s financial status, women’s health, 
women’s well-being” (NPR News, December 19, 2015). Another Saudi Arabian 
women’s rights activist, Wajeha al-Huwaider, said “…this is a great news, women’s 
voices will finally be heard” (Al Arabiya, September 25, 2011). Hence, the new rights 
granted Saudi Arabian women a sense of optimism; as one Saudi pro-women activist, 
Maha al-Qahtani said, “… it is a good sign, and we have to take advantage of it, … but 
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we still need more rights” (MacFarquhar 2011). Similarly, Maha Akeel, a member of the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation said:  
…I think it's great that several women won in different regions of Saudi Arabia. It 
shows how much Saudi society has progressed on the issue of not only accepting, but 
also actually supporting women in public office, and this could mean that more change 
is to come. I'm surprised. We expected maybe one or two women would win (Black, 
The Guardian, December 13, 2015). 
 
Purpose of Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine political participation, political repression 
and political culture in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, inquiring how the combination of 
these factors affect women’s efforts in achieving equality and rights in the wake of the 
December 2015 elections. In the past, Saudi Arabian citizens made numerous attempts at 
demanding political inclusivity and civil liberties through informal gatherings and 
protests. Public demonstrations sparked in 2011, when human rights activists in Qatif 
demanded the release of nine men who were held by Saudi Arabian authorities for years 
without a trial. Other Saudi Arabians joined this public demonstration in an attempt to 
demand political reforms, and soon protests spread from Qatif to Awamiya, Buraydah 
and Riyadh. The response by Saudi Arabian authorities was immediate and led to violent 
confrontation between the security forces and the protestors. The security forces 
established militarized checkpoints and raided the houses of Saudi Arabian citizens in 
search of human rights activists who were labeled by the regime as “terrorists” (BBC 
News, May 30, 2014). The elites of the Kingdom reacted with repression, censuring 
political opponents, human rights activists, and women’s activists. The extent of political 
repression doubled after 2011, as the government instigated travel bans, termination of 
employment, prosecution and detention in order to silence political activists. Saudi 
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Arabian police and judicial authorities harassed and jailed pro-rights activists like Samar 
Badawi, who was advocating against the male guardianship supremacy, and Manal al-
Sharif, an advocate for the “Right2Dignity-Right2Drive” campaign, who was arrested by 
the religious police for driving in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has a long history of 
human rights violations because accommodation of competing political opponents has 
never been a viable option (Human Rights Watch 2013).  
Initially, I wanted to inquire from Saudi Arabian women whether new inclusivity 
has had an impact on women’s rights and equality in the Kingdom. I wanted to know 
how Saudi Arabian women felt about the 2015 elections – the first time they were 
allowed to vote and to run for office. As a strong advocate for women’s political 
emancipation and women’s rights, I could not remain neutral in my research 
investigation. I was not dispassionate because I hold that women should be equal 
participants in the decision-making process - women not only ought to be present, but 
their voices ought to be represented in the political apparatus of every state. Through 
voice women could break through a discriminatory pattern enforced by a specific 
political culture. Through voice women could influence political elites to initiate a 
favorable policy that would enhance women’s social positions in the country. The 2015 
Municipal Council elections were a breakthrough for women’s emancipation in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For the first time women were privileged because they were 
allowed to participate equally with Saudi Arabian men in politics. I was curious about the 
topic and aspired to learn more from Saudi Arabian women because I expected that Saudi 
Arabian women would be eager to share their experiences and opinions. Despite the 
history of political repression Saudi Arabian women acquired political space. I thought 
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that now, Saudi Arabian women enjoy more freedom and hence would be willing to 
discuss this great political achievement if I approach them. For my study I wanted to 
know how Saudi Arabian women felt about their participation and emancipation. I sought 
to interview Saudi Arabian women to find out their opinions and perspectives, but in the 
course of this research process, I discovered that aspects of political repression and 
political culture were as important, if not more so, than the aspects of women’s 
participation. Political repression mattered because it existed and impeded women’s 
political participation. I saw this from the low turnout on Election Day – only few women 
were admitted as Councilors, few women participated as voters, and few women were 
willing to be interviewed for my study. Saudi Arabian women were not free to express 
their opinions and share their attitudes about the new political opening. Initially, Saudi 
Arabian women had great expectations; they perceived that the new political opening 
would enhance women’s social status. Instead, the electoral process revealed numerous 
legal barriers that reinforced women’s marginalization in the society. Furthermore, many 
Saudi Arabian women I approached were uncooperative and unwilling to share 
information and participate in the research study. This was odd because if women were 
advocating for participation, why were they unwilling to talk about it? What is the 
relationship between political participation and political repression and its effects on 
women in Saudi Arabia? What is the relationship between political culture and political 
repression?  
In the course of the study, I also discovered that political culture mattered because 
it prevented some conservative Saudi Arabian women from aspiring to political power 
and women’s emancipation. There are many Saudi Arabian women who strictly adhere to 
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Wahhabi ideology and conform to the status quo. Traditional culture prompts women to 
remain politically disengaged and passive. Through generations, women in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia have been inclined to accept limitations in their social space, defined by 
strong religious-cultural rhetoric that dictates what part women shall play or shall not 
play in the society. The conservative Saudi Arabian women were not willing to 
participate in electoral process or in my research because they did not perceive political 
participation as a universal right; women were not interested in political participation 
because this was against their unique cultural ascriptions. It could be argued that the 
Saudi Arabian state reinforces political culture – i.e. a status quo – through the means of 
political repression. For instance, imposing Wahhabi ideology upon the population to 
maintain control over women and to prevent them from aspiring to liberal views. A lot of 
women conform to the status quo because they have been accustomed to it for a long 
time. Perhaps traditional gender roles prevented some Saudi Arabian women from voting 
and standing in elections, because these women viewed political participation as a 
Western ideological imposition that leads to a decay of genuine Saudi Arabian culture. 
Hence, in Saudi Arabia the low electoral turnout could be the result of the electoral 
barriers that were enlisted to inhibit women’s political participation, as well as women’s 
disinterest in political participation due to strong adherence to unique Saudi Arabian 
culture. Political culture is a repressive mechanism used by Saudi Arabian authorities to 
prevent women from achieving emancipation and freedom. With the help of Wahhabi 
ideology, the government is able to reinforce political repression and impose restrictions 
upon Saudi Arabian women’s political activism. However, when the Saudi Arabian 
government wishes to obtain the support of women and international legitimacy, it 
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implements a liberal pro-woman reform regardless of the strong Wahhabi cultural 
sentiments against it.  
Therefore, for the purpose of this research investigation, I examined theories and 
empirical evidence on political repression, political participation, and women in politics 
in the context of Saudi Arabian society. I describe the barriers I encountered in collecting 
information on Saudi Arabian women’s views, I examine the historical background of 
women’s political participation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and I discuss in detail 
the responses of women who were willing to share their opinions. 
Personal Story 
The fact that Saudi Arabian society is more repressive towards its women, 
granting women political space only recently in 2015, increased my curiosity about the 
subject. As a non-Arab woman originating from a former Soviet Republic and living in 
the Arabian Gulf, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), I have witnessed repression, gender 
segregation, and change towards greater equality in the Arab world. I have been exposed 
to Arab culture and traditions since I was thirteen years old, and I am able to understand 
the cultural-religious rhetoric that influences and determines women’s status in society. I 
attended an all girls’ school, since it was forbidden to mix with boys or even to talk to 
them, although they studied in the building next to ours and we shared a bus ride together 
every day. Natives of the UAE were generally intrusive, judgmental, and opinioned. 
Everyone seemed to care about everyone else and interfered in the affairs of others. In 
this sense, the society acted as cultural police ensuring that individuals behaved 
appropriately. Misbehavior or violations of cultural norm are frowned upon, especially in 
13 
regards to a woman; for example, a woman should be dressed decently, as provocative 
clothing may portray a wrong image.  
However, modernization brought in a transformation of the society’s norms and 
customs and it increased public space for women. For example, the influx of tourists 
diffused Western ideas, especially in Dubai. Women were freed. Although life in the 
UAE is much more liberal in regards to women’s access to public, economic, and 
political space than in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, there are a few significant parallels. 
As political sociologist, Mona AlMunajjed (1997) said: “We can understand the present 
Arabia only by questioning and probing the problems of its women.” I could not agree 
more. Just as in Saudi Arabia, in the UAE the patriarchy is enforced. Native UAE women 
have to obtain permission from their father for practically everything, such as driving, 
attending school, or going out. The difference is that this relation is a private matter and it 
is usually done informally. The government does not enforce it, as there are no religious 
police who stop women to inspect whether they have permission to be at the mall, park, 
or the beach. Moreover, gender segregation is enforced only within governmental 
institutions, which have separate women’s sections for the comfort of conservative 
women. Hence, women in the UAE enjoy more freedoms than Saudi Arabian women.  
Saudi Arabian Women 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the state institutions are comprised of informal rules 
that are embodied in cultural and religious rhetoric. The informal rules include long 
lasting social practices, traditions, and religious morals, whereas the formal rules include 
codified Islamic law or Shar’ia (Kangas, Haider, and Fraser 2014, 7). For example, an 
informal rule may encourage women to pursue early marriages at the expense of 
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education or professional careers. In regards to gender dynamics within Saudi Arabian 
families, these are strictly guided by the informal rules that are tied to Islamic scriptures 
keeping men in a privileged position. Adrienne Rich (1986, 149) defined the term 
“patriarchy” as a, “...a familial-social, ideological, political system in which men-by 
force, direct pressure, or through ritual, tradition, law, and language, customs, education 
and division of labor determine what part women shall or shall not play...” This concept 
directly applies to Saudi Arabian women today. Robert Filmer (1991) further elaborated 
on the term patriarchy in his work “Patriarcha” to apply to a particular type of political 
system, i.e. a kingship system based on patrilineality. Similarly, Allan Johnson (2005, 55) 
argued, “patriarchy refers to a particular type of society in which both men and women 
participate but which continuously promotes male privilege.” Nevertheless, in patriarchal 
structures such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, not all men attain a privileged position; 
some remain marginalized, including homosexuals. Likewise, not all women condemn 
the system; some remain supportive and raise their children to conform to it (Bennett 
2006, 56).  
Saudi Arabia is a unique case because it applies a mix of cultural-religious 
rhetoric in order to limit Saudi Arabian women’s political participation. Saudi Arabian 
society is a highly conservative society, in which cultural and tribal customs often 
overlap with the Islamic religion. Saudi Arabian women face numerous daily barriers that 
prevent women from acquiring social, economic, and political wellbeing. The 
government administers strict gender segregation that further limits Saudi Arabian 
women’s access to public space. Saudi Arabia’s human rights records in relation to 
women’s rights have often been called into question. Although women in recent years 
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have been granted political suffrage, there are numerous other activities in which women 
are restricted from engaging. Saudi Arabian women are not allowed in coffee shops, they 
are banned from entering cemeteries, from reading uncensored magazines, playing sports, 
interacting with men, and most famously of all, banned from driving a car (The Week, 
February 4, 2016). Saudi authorities often use Islam to justify women’s lack of freedom 
in the society. For the government, “Islam [is] the main culprit behind the incremental 
development in the status of women” (Sabbagh 2004). However, Islam is not responsible 
for women’s marginalization in Saudi Arabian society, as Islam does not deter women 
from achieving political, economic or social positions. There are many Islamic countries 
such as Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh where women have achieved top political 
positions. In reality, it is the male supremacy, or patriarchy, that is a major force 
impeding Saudi Arabian women’s empowerment and participation. Patriarchal structures 
of society reinforce authoritarianism. There is a matrix of power hierarchy across social 
classes; the idea of the ruled and the ruler reinforces the authoritarian culture in the 
society (Matear 1999, 105-106). 
This thesis is comprised of five chapters. Chapter two provides a historical 
background of the current state of affairs in relation to Saudi Arabian women’s 
participation and status. The chapter also identifies the role of political culture in 
facilitating Saudi Arabian women’s marginalization and oppression in the society, and 
outlines women’s attitudes and views towards freedoms and rights. Chapter three 
describes theories of political repression and political participation to explain the 
functioning of authoritarian states and how women’s political participation fits. Chapter 
four introduces the methodology used to investigate the political opening granted to 
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Saudi Arabian women. In addition, there is analysis of information collected to 
understand repression, culture, and participation, followed by a conclusion on Saudi 
Arabian women’s political participation.  
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND 
The aim of this chapter is to outline the current state of affairs in relation to Saudi 
Arabian women’s political, economic and social status. To understand whether recent 
political opening has provided Saudi Arabian women actual power and brought about a 
feasible impact towards women’s equality and rights in the Kingdom, one ought to 
unravel women’s overall position across time through the tracing of historical trajectories 
that shaped and defined the position of women in Saudi Arabian society. Furthermore, 
one ought to evaluate the influences of political culture that have contributed to Saudi 
Arabian women’s marginalization and oppression over time; this chapter provides 
explanations for these relationships. It also identifies efforts in participation made by 
Saudi Arabian women in an attempt to achieve women’s rights and equality in the 
Kingdom, and recognizes the Saudi Arabian government’s responses to women’s past 
pro-rights initiatives by giving specific examples of repression. Lastly, this chapter 
describes electoral and cultural barriers Saudi Arabian women encountered during their 
participation in the 2015 elections. 
Saudi Arabian Law 
Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam, established in the seventh century A.D. 
The Saudi Arabian nation inherited these Islamic values, which led to a distinctive Saudi 
Arabian culture. The Kingdom incorporates about 772,000 square miles, which make up 
80 percent of the territory of the Arabian Peninsula. According to the 2016 national 
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census, about 32 million people comprise the Saudi Arabian population, of which only 8 
million are non-nationals (Worldometers 2016). Traditionally there were no land 
demarcations in the Arabian Peninsula as sovereignty was determined by tribal alliances. 
Only with the discovery of oil in the Arabian Peninsula did territorial calculus become an 
important aspect that led to long negotiations between Saudi Arabia and its neighboring 
countries (Long 2005,1-3). Saudi Arabian society is highly nationalistic and conservative, 
and most citizens view Westernization as the moral decay of genuine Saudi Arabian 
society (Long 2005,1-3). As King Faisal has claimed: “We do not need to import foreign 
traditions. We have a history and a glorious past. We led the Arabs and the World… With 
what did we lead them? The word of the one God and the Shar’ia of His Prophet” (Long 
2005,1-3). Saudi Arabia follows Islamic law, which is addressed in Article 1 of the Basic 
law of Government issued by King Fahd on March 1, 1992. The law reads: “The Saudi 
Arabian Kingdom is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its religion; God’s book 
(the Qur’an) and the Sunna of the Prophet forms the bases of its constitution; Arabic is 
the language and Riyadh is the capital” (Long 2005, 20). Saudi Arabians often promote 
the idea that Saudi Arabia is the only voice of Islam, and that the entire land is a holy 
Islamic land (Hammond 2012, 39). The Ministry of Justice administers Saudi Arabia’s 
judicial system, and Saudi Arabian judges are bound to follow Shar’ia law (Long 2005, 
20). But the law is not codified and Saudi Arabian courts are independent from the 
central political authority - God’s law is above the government’s law. Moreover, there is 
no judicial precedent, thus judges are free to implement their own interpretations of the 
Qur’an and the Sunna, which could yield different rulings despite the identical 
particularities of the cases (Tonnessen 2016, 2). The King appoints religious scholars to 
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the Council of Senior Religious Scholars headed by the grand Mufti, forming the 
Permanent Committee for Religious Research and Fatwas. These judges follow the 
principles of the Hanbali school of Sunni jurisprudence, and are responsible for the 
issuance of fatwas (legal opinions) in regards to clarification of certain aspects in the 
Qur’an (Long 2005, 21). In 2009, the King expanded the membership of the Permanent 
Committee for Religious Research and Fatwas from 16 to 21, adding five scholars 
outside the traditional Hanbali School of Islamic thought (Hammond 2012, 46). The 
Hanbali School of Islamic thought is the smallest and youngest among the four major 
Sunni schools, which was founded by Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (A.D. 780-855). The 
Hanbali jurisprudence is strictly traditionalist as it rejects “the rational elements” of ijma 
(legally binding consensus of key jurists) and qiyas (reasoning by analogy to one of the 
higher sources) in its interpretations of the Qur’an (Tonnessen 2016, 4). 
Wahhabism 
The Wahhabi religious revivalist movement emerged in the eighteenth century. It 
centers on cleansing the Muslim faith from impurities by enforcing religious practices 
and piety. The Wahhabi creed is embedded in Saudi Arabia state’s ideology due to a 
tribal agreement that was established in 1744 between the clan of Al-Saud and the 
puritanical Hanbali scholar, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791) (Husein 2014). 
The Wahhabis, belonging to the Ikhwan group, allied with King Abdulaziz ibn Abdul 
Rahman ibn Muhammad Al Saud (1932-1953) in securing the territories in the Arabian 
Peninsula. The alliance created a power sharing agreement between the religious 
Wahhabi clerics and the monarchy that is evident today in the politics of Saudi Arabia 
(Al-Ibrahim 2015). Wahhabi provided Al-Saud’s clan the legitimacy they needed for 
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conquest and expansion. They used Wahhabi ideology to impose their supremacy upon 
neighboring tribes and local communities. This unity allowed for the Saudi Arabian clan 
to control most of the areas in the Arabian Peninsula with continuous raids on Medina, 
Syria and Iraq. After Abdulaziz took over Riyadh in 1902, his mufti was given a task to 
establish a voluntarily religious police force that came to be known as the Committee for 
the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV) (Hammond 2012, 16). In 
1979, following the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Al-Saud granted great leverage 
to the religious police to regain control over Saudi Arabian society. The siege of the 
Mosque resulted in a culture of fear, thus pushing the King to initiate drastic measures. 
The King ordered the official Wahhabi clergy to stiffen their control over mosques, 
courts, and schools, which brought about an era of political repression (Hammond 2012, 
25). In short, promotion of religious Wahhabi fanaticism was favorable to the rulers as it 
enabled the control of the population by preventing citizens from deviating to liberal 
views. Hence, the religious police became a mechanism of the government’s power that 
applied coercion and repressive means in order to subjugate Saudi Arabian society to 
complete obedience (Hammond 2012, 17).  
The religious police adhere to strict Wahhabi ideology that denounces everything 
that advocates the divergence from the absolute authority of God as takfir (apostasy) 
(Crooke 2014). This ideology is apologetic and is extreme because it disapproves 
innovations, creativity and rational thinking (El-Fadi 2014, 208). Even ijitihad, 
(difference in opinion) is considered deviant or evil and Muslims who engage in such 
practices are defined as heretics (El-Fadi 2014, 223). In Wahhabi ideology either a king 
or a caliph signified the absolute authority on earth. If one was available, such a leader 
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ought to be obeyed by all the Muslims, while those who refrained from conformity ought 
“to be killed, their wives and daughters violated, and their possessions confiscated” 
(Crooke 2014). The movement obtained nationalistic aspirations in the late twentieth 
century when the exclusion of women became a visible sign that laid the ground for the 
establishment of the Saudi Arabian state (Al-Rasheed 2013, 44). 
The status of women in the Kingdom is shaped by the historical legacies of 
Wahhabi ideology – a doctrine that commands the right and forbids the wrong (Al-
Rasheed 2013, 43). In Wahhabi ideology, woman is a symbol of sin because she turns 
religious men away from their devotion to God. Thus, in order to protect the religious 
men, women ought to cover from head to toe to avoid the seduction of men (Basrawi 
2007, 34). Wahhabi clerics believe that women’s hands, feet and face have to be covered 
fully in public because they depict awrah, which literally means “private parts” or 
nakedness (Zoepf 2016, 71) As Hannah Arendt has argued, in classless societies 
“periodic purges of certain social groups are necessary,” and in Saudi Arabian society it 
is the women who serve as victims of political and social oppression (Hammond 2012, 
94). Today, in Saudi Arabia, women are completely removed from the glares of 
outsiders, hidden by tall walls built around villas, behind a veil or the black tinted 
window of a car. In conferences, woman would sometimes speak out to the public 
through a loud speaker from a segregated compartment, thus everyone could hear her but 
no one would dare lay their eyes on her. The Wahhabi ulema (clerics) view women as a 
threat to the moral integrity of the Saudi Arabian community. In the past the clerics have 
pushed women out of social space; for instance, women were active participants in 
traditional practices and religious rituals (Al-Rasheed 2013, 51). In Wahhabi ideology 
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women have the potential to create fitna i.e. trouble, thus women ought to be hidden in 
order to prevent them from being alluring to men. In Saudi Arabian society, women’s 
positions are central as they are responsible for safeguarding the honor of the family or 
the tribe. It is expected that women display piety so that the honor of the family is 
preserved (Hammond 2012, 93).  
In Saudi Arabia religious police are in charge of prevention of vices, and they 
oversee aspects related to women’s behavior and the dress code in the public realm. For 
instance, in order to ensure that women are properly dressed in public spaces, religious 
police often circulate at Saudi Arabian malls, coffee shops, and parks (Le Renard 2014, 
50). The religious commission every year boasts about handling over 300,000 cases thus 
highlighting their importance for Saudi Arabian society. Saudi Arabian women generally 
avoid encounters with religious police as these encounters are degrading and humiliating. 
Religious police never address women directly; instead, they communicate through the 
use of a microphone to mock women for certain unacceptable acts in front of everyone. 
Thus women’s public humiliation is seen as a feasible punishment (Le Renard 2014, 52). 
Even though many families allow their daughters to wear a headscarf and leave their 
faces open in public, religious police condemn this measures, calling such girls 
religiously immoral. Although inappropriate veiling by girls strolling the shopping malls 
could not grant precedence for arrest in some instances, because in Islamic culture it is 
the man who commits a sin if he looks at an unveiled women (Le Renard 2014, 112), 
nonetheless members of CPVPV often abuse their power, arresting and instituting 
explicit violence against women. For instance, in March 2002, a fire at an all girls school 
in Mecca resulted in the death of 15 girls due to the fact that religious police forbade 800 
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girls trapped in the building from escaping due to the fact that they were without 
headscarves. Since 2002, the CPVPV has been criticized internationally and within the 
Saudi Arabian society. In the past religious police were respected and obeyed, but today 
they are often mocked. To gain control and to promote Wahhabi culture, religious police 
often attend all girls’ schools to teach students about the attributes of a moral woman. In 
April 2006, videocassettes circulated around all girls’ school depicting a contrast of two 
women: one wearing the abaya and walking to hell, and one wearing the niqab and 
walking to paradise. This video breeds the culture of moral women as opposed to kafirat, 
impious women. In the view of the religious police, girls’ moral education ought to be 
taught from early childhood, so that when growing up these girls will adhere to the 
Wahhabi ideological creed (Le Renard 2014, 111). Article 153 of the Saudi Arabian 
policy on education states: “A girl’s education aims at giving her the correct Islamic 
education to enable her to be in life a successful housewife, an exemplary wife and a 
good mother.” Initially, the ulema even prevented girls from acquiring higher education, 
fearing that this would push women away from their moral obligations (AlMunajjed 
1997, 68).  
Furthermore, Saudi Arabian women are dependent upon a male guardian, or 
mahram, without whose permission women are not even able to exit the house. Saudi 
Arabian women require legally attested permission from their male guardians related to 
almost anything they wish to do in their lives. Under the decree of the 1992 Basic Law of 
Saudi Arabia, the law does not guarantee gender equality. Article 8 stipulates that 
equality is defined in accordance with the Shar’ia law, which holds women as legal 
minors under the discretion of male guardians (Gender Index: Saudi Arabia 2014). In 
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other words, male guardianship policy subjects adult women to be treated as legal 
minors. For example, universities require notary attested permission from a guardian 
before enrolling a woman in courses she chooses to study, and female students travelling 
abroad on a scholarship program must be accompanied by a male guardian during the 
entire travel (Hammond 2012, 99). Under the formal legal system women could seek 
medical treatment or employment without the permission of a guardian, but the legality 
of such law is overruled by tradition and religious interpretations. Men often use the role 
of mahram as a way to impose domination and control, and sometimes to punish women 
(Gorney 2016).  
Without the accompaniment of a male guardian, Saudi Arabian women are unable 
to obtain documents issued by the government. A woman cannot travel with her children 
without signed permission, nor can she enroll or pay fees for her children without written 
consent. Every time a Saudi Arabian woman travels abroad or arrives back to Saudi 
Arabia, her male guardian receives a notification through email or phone. Even though 
Saudi Arabia Interior Ministry allow women over the age of 45 to travel without 
permission, the airport officials still demand a written proof. Furthermore, in the absence 
of female sections in governmental agencies, a woman is forced to appear accompanied 
by male guardian. Access to justice also implies limitations; a woman must be wearing 
full cover or niqab in order to be heard by the court, while her official guardian testifies 
for her identity during the court procedure. Such policies are discriminatory as they limit 
women’s basic human and citizenry rights (Human Rights Watch, April 20, 2008).  
Gender segregation is another factor that was instituted by Wahhabi traditions to 
increase Saudi Arabian women’s dependence upon male relatives. Most Saudi Arabian 
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women are financially dependent upon male guardians because they are banned from 
seeking employment in unsegregated sectors. The Saudi Arabian ulema hold that Shar’ia 
bans women from being in contact with unrelated men, and assert that the mixing of 
genders in the workforce would lead to “evil consequences” (AlMunajjed 1997, 40). The 
permanent Committee for issuing Religious Edicts, chaired by Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul 
Aziz al-Sheikh issued fatwas against women’s participation in the labor force when King 
Abdullah approved a plan for the facilitation of about 70,000 new jobs for women. The 
permanent Committee declared that women should not be integrated in offices where 
there is no gender segregation, thus banning women from mixing with the opposite 
gender. Other clerics issued fatwas stating that there should not be total equality between 
women and men as it contravenes with Islam (Alhargan 2012, 131). Wahhabists also 
advocate for the removal of women from public television, claiming that women should 
not appear in television programs or music videos, and images of women should be 
removed from newspapers and magazines. The committee also holds that girls playing 
sports would lead to moral disgrace; thus when Ministry of Education advocated for 
establishing physical activity courses, the Committee issued a fatwa against it (Dickinson 
2013).  
In Islamic history, the segregation of women was nonexistent. The first wife of 
the Prophet Mohammed, Khadija, was a well-respected businesswoman who owned and 
administered a caravan. It was stated that Khadija also exerted political influence; she 
personally financed and advised the Prophet Mohammed during his struggles. Another 
prominent woman was Umm Waraquah, a leading imam who recited prayers for both 
men and women during the Prophet’s time (AlMunajjed 1997, 41). Nevertheless, 
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Wahhabi clerics perceive women’s access to public space through employment and 
education as dangerous “Western ideas,” and they therefore use the rule of gender 
segregation to prevent women from access to these areas. Enforcement of gender 
segregation and maintenance of separate and parallel institutions exclusively for women 
costs the government of Saudi Arabia large sums of money, and is made possible due to 
oil wealth (Le Renard 2008, 613). For example, Saudi Arabian women attend all girls’ 
schools and universities, they dine only in separate “family” restaurants and cafes, and 
there are governmental departments, bank branches, and travel agencies devoted to 
women. The fast-food restaurants also have separate counters for women (Zoepf 2016, 
185).  
Employment and Education 
Most political scholars argue that women’s empowerment in Saudi Arabia 
increased drastically after the period of oil boom in the mid-1970s (Altorki 1992, 96). 
Petrodollars generated employment opportunities along the service sector while also 
bringing developments in the field of education, which allowed Saudi Arabian women a 
greater participation in the country. Education permitted women to acquire clerical, 
teaching, nursing, and administrative jobs, yet during the 1982 recession most of these 
women were left unemployed. However, a prominent Saudi Arabian scholar Soraya 
Altorki (1992, 96) has argued otherwise, saying that females of Saudi Arabia were 
always active in labor employment long before the 1970s, and the oil boom just shifted 
the pattern of female labor employment from agricultural to service sector. According to 
research conducted by Soraya Altorki, before the oil boom women were active in 
traditional farming practices. In the town of Unayzah, women were involved in farming 
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for palm trees and wheat. Some women engaged in the gathering of wood, mainly 
because economic hardship pushed men to allow their women to engage in such labor-
intensive activity (Brill 1992, 98). In addition, women engaged in commerce such as 
selling their agricultural products in women’s only markets. Most of these women sellers 
were however uneducated, unmarried, or divorced, as socio-cultural norms prevented 
young and single women from working in the markets (Brill 1992, 106).  
Education was established for the first time in 1930s but it was limited to boys 
and only pertained to learning the Qur’an, mathematics, grammar, and writing. 
Nevertheless, obtaining education for female students in Saudi Arabia was not a 
consequence of the oil boom; as early as the 1950s, girls were able to attend informal 
schools created and run by women in their own homes. The type of education received by 
these girls was limited to Qur’anic memorization, yet wealthier families were able to 
grant their daughters education in secular subjects. The first 15 schools for girls were 
established in the 1960s. The attendance and enrollment rate among these schools was 
high, which stipulated the establishment of intermediary schools in 1970 and secondary 
schools in 1974 (Brill 1992, 101). Even though oil wealth provided women with quality 
education, which will be discussed in the subsequent section, it however inhibited 
women’s employment in the Kingdom. Overdependence on the oil industry led to a 
decline in the growth of non-oil industries, thus reducing the competitiveness of the state 
in regards to non-oil industries in the international market (Karl 1999, 34-36). When a 
government concentrates production around a single commodity such as oil, it tends to 
impede women’s equality in regards to the labor force. Oil production required intensive 
manpower, which pushed women out of the industry (Ross 2008, 108). Article 160 of the 
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Labor and Workmen Law holds: “Adolescents, juveniles and women may not be 
employed in hazardous operations or harmful industries…in no case may men and 
women co-mingle in places of work or in accessory facilities or other appartenances 
thereto.” Moreover, the Labor Code of 2006 promotes women’s employment without 
discrimination but hypocritically identifies the fields in which a woman can work based 
on her “motherly” nature. Saudi Arabian women are permitted to seek employment in 
areas pertaining their “femaleness,” e.g. teaching and nursing jobs (AlMunajjed 1997, 
86). 
Saudi Arabian women have frequently been denied access to economic resources, 
a crucial tool in women’s empowerment that can strengthen their power position within 
the male dominant social hierarchy. Saudi Arabian society prevents women from seeking 
employment because it holds that it is the responsibility of men to support women 
financially (Al-Rasheed 2013, 115). Economic resources such as finance can grant 
confidence and voice to women, and in the long run would improve women’s 
participation in the decision-making process (Kangas, Haider, and Fraser 2014, 51). 
When women are not involved in the labor force they tend to have less political 
influence. Participation in the labor force is important for women because it tends to 
increase women’s political influence by increasing women’s access to networks and 
women’s visibility in the society (Ross 2008, 108). Therefore, it is crucial for a woman to 
be financially independent from her husband in order to improve her own social status. 
However, women who are willing to seek independence through employment are still 
limited in regards to job opportunities due to strict gender segregation laws and lack of 
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non-oil industries. Thus, oil production not only pushed women out of employment but 
also inhibited women’s social position.  
Women’s Benefits 
Even though oil wealth inhibited women’s access to employment, it generated 
many other advantages for Saudi Arabian women. Some Saudi Arabian women who 
belong to wealthier families see no worries and instead have a lavish lifestyle. These 
women enjoy short travel trips to Milan, Paris and London for shopping sprees; they are 
free from house responsibilities and raising children due to the employment of a few 
foreign housemaids. They further are not required to work because traditional custom 
permits women to stay at home, as it is a man’s responsibility to provide for the family. 
Moreover, wealthy Saudi Arabian women do not experience issues related to mobility 
because they can afford to hire personal chauffeurs to drive them around (Hammond 
2012, 107). Overall, oil wealth prompted modernization that brought in technology, 
infrastructure, Internet communication, Western brands, restaurants, and banks. But most 
importantly it pushed the government of Saudi Arabia to promote women’s access to 
education. Thus even non-wealthy Saudi Arabian women benefited from oil wealth 
because quality education was made available (Hamdan 2005, 51). For example, in 1978 
the King Faisal University opened Dammam City campus for women, offering education 
in colleges of medicine, nursing and agriculture. In 1979 King Saud University in Riyadh 
opened its doors to women – offering courses in Arabic, English, history and geography. 
Today, there are seven universities with campuses for women, over hundred of colleges 
and several privately owned colleges and universities (Hamdan 2005, 51). Furthermore, 
oil production generated wealth that allowed the government to implement policies that 
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enhanced women’s education. In another prominent example, it is estimated that nearly 
90,000 Saudi Arabian students have benefited from the King Abdullah Scholarship 
Program that sponsors Saudi Arabians to obtain education across the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada. Bessma Momani, an associate professor at the University 
of Waterloo, reported that the program started in 2005 and was expected to continue until 
2020. About 50 percent of Saudi Arabian students studying abroad are women (Momani 
2015). Hence, the government’s initiative to promote women’s education not only 
contributed to high enrolment of girls in educational institutions, but also created 
employment for some women in the field of education (Hamdan 2005, 51). Perhaps 
because Saudi Arabian women acquired so many benefits that they cannot forgo, they are 
willing to conform to policies that reinforce women’s inequality and marginalization in 
the society.  
Women’s Voices: Activists and Journalists 
Women’s political activism in Saudi Arabia emerged due to the sense of increased 
alienation from government issued policies (Henderson and Jeydal 2007, 47). When 
women experience a sense of consciousness towards certain injustices that they had been 
involuntarily accustomed to, they join a movement in a collective action to change a 
government policy that they deem unfair (Henderson and Jeydal 2007, 52). In Saudi 
Arabia, women activists advocate for equality and justice in regards to women’s status in 
society. For example, Maha Akeela, a Saudi Arabian journalist for Arab News based in 
Jeddah, published an article in 2007 for the website Aafaq calling for women’s equality 
and speaking against the dictation of male guardianship. She argues against the idea that 
women should be forced to seek permission from male guardians in regards to all 
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matters; currently, women cannot make decisions on their own in regard to their personal 
matters or body, and a 70-year-old woman is forced to seek permission (written, signed 
and notarized) from legal guardian before stepping out of her house. This is disrespectful 
in regards to women and Islam, because in Islam a mother ought to be highly respected. 
Major and minor decisions about a woman are made without even consulting her, and as 
a result a woman could be forced to marry a person she does not desire, or divorce a 
person she loves. Women are enslaved in Saudi Arabia because society sets these 
traditional boundaries on every aspect of a woman’s life (Lichter 2009, 287-288). 
Another women’s advocate, Saudi Arabian journalist Lubna Hussain,, has written about 
women’s inequality in the Kingdom. She voiced her concern about the portrayal of Saudi 
Arabian women in Western media as backward and veiled; for her, this does not do 
justice to Saudi Arabian women. She argues that when the suffragettes’ movement started 
in the West in the twentieth century, the women of Saudi Arabia already possessed 
certain rights including inheritance and the owning of property. For Hussain, the obstacle 
to women’s rights is not religion but rather religious interpretations through the lens of 
male supremacy (Lichter 2009, 305).  
On the contrary, Islamist women activists have established a counter campaign 
known as “My guardian know what’s best for me” in support of Saudi Arabian cultural 
traditions and Islamic laws. The campaign was able to secure about 5,400 signatures 
within just two month, thus depicting general support for religious-cultural rhetoric. The 
conservative women criticized international reporters who are only interested in hearing 
one side of a story, i.e., one that advocates for women’s freedom and equality. The 
conservative Saudi Arabian women argued, “if Saudi women were unsatisfied with their 
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male guardians they could always bring the case to the Shar’ia court for adjudication and 
for transfer of responsibility to a more trustworthy guardian” (Zoeff 2011). However, 
even most of the Saudi Arabian liberal women activists today do not advocate against 
Islam. They instead advocate for dismantling the misuse of Islamic teachings and the 
alterations of the hadith. The misinterpretations of the Qur’an are presented in a way that 
it used to reinforce women’s inequality in society, e.g. the covering of women’s faces 
completely with niqab. Similarly, Saudi Arabian columnist Maha al-Hujailan speaks 
against the imposition of the black robe (abaya) as a dress code for the women of Saudi 
Arabia. She argues that Saudi Arabian men often use religion to subjugate women into 
subordination and enslavement. For instance, the idea of completely covering a woman’s 
body is relatively new because in the past women have not worn the abaya. The essence 
of the abaya projects silence upon women, because women wearing such garments are 
expected to behave in a humble way i.e. prohibited from laughing or talking freely in 
public (Lichter 2009, 292). Women activists argue that at the time of the Prophet 
Mohammad, women had both economic and political rights (Lichter 2009, 284). For 
instance, journalist Zainab Hifni criticizes religious clerics who label any pro-woman 
hadith as unreliable. Another activist, Nadia Bakhurji, took the political road to raise 
concerns in regards to women’s inequality. In 2005, she contested the elections for the 
Board of the Council of Saudi Arabian Engineers and acquired a seat as the only female 
in a 10-member board. She currently advocates for implementing women’s quotas in the 
Municipal Council Elections (Lichter 2009, 285-286).  
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Driving Ban Campaign 
Conservative women may be equally active in an opposing effort to restore 
women’s traditional roles, femininity and virtues, such as women’s religious movements 
that see aspects of Westernization as a moral decay that impacts their sociocultural norms 
(Henderson and Jeydal 2007, 62-63). For instance, in Saudi Arabia conservative women 
perceive that women’s driving is a luxury rather than a necessity. Conservative Saudi 
Arabians believe that if women were permitted to drive, this may lead to sexual 
harassment and would “encourage women not to wear the niqab in public.” It may also 
destroy family cohesion, as Saudi Arabian husbands would be exposed to women drivers 
who will no longer be under the supervision of male guardians (Abdel-Rahem 2013). 
Hence, not all women in Saudi Arabia want to drive; some are against it. According to 
one Saudi Arabian woman who was interviewed in a poll that probed for women’s 
attitudes towards driving: 
If they allow women to drive, there will be many negative effects of the whole society. 
Furthermore, there will be many things that don’t comply with our Islamic principles. 
This will open the door for women to imitate men in everything, and who knows... 
there would be calls for banning niqab, this way a woman will lose her femininity; and 
if a woman goes out without a guardian, she may lose her honor (Abdel-Rahem 2013). 
 
In a sense, Saudi women are divided into at least two different camps: those who 
advocate for equality and freedom, and those who advocate for preservation of culture 
and Islamic values. Since 2008, women activists have been registering online journals, 
collecting petitions, and initiating campaigns for women’s rights and equality. Others 
have been involved in more provocative participation or illegal activities to mark their 
liberty, such as taking their veils off, driving despite the ban, or accepting employment 
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without a guardian’s permission (Zoeff 2011). Following this in 2014, two women 
activists – Lujain al-Hathloul, 25, and Maysa al-Amoudi, 33 – were detained for driving 
at the Saudi Arabia-United Arab Emirates border. Both were online advocates who 
supported an end to the driving ban, while calling other women to join their ambitious 
campaign. When driving, al-Hathloul posted footage on YouTube that depicted Saudi 
Arabian men drivers giving thumbs-up expressing their support for women driving 
(Human Rights Watch, December 2, 2014). The existence of a Saudi Arabian all-female 
rock band under the name “Accolade” is another impressive example considering the 
conservative nature of Saudi Arabian society. The members of the band are all students at 
one of the Universities in Jeddah. When they published their first song via Facebook it 
went viral, attracting many young Saudi Arabian fans. The girls in the band however do 
not disclose their identity, nor do they display their faces in video clips, nor use their 
family names. As explained by one band member: “anonymous identity online lets us 
thrive in this strict Saudi Arabian society” (Mcevers 2008). 
Baladi Movement 
When the Saudi Arabian government restricts women’s access to public space and 
women’s participation across the social, economic and political realms, women unite in 
collective action in an attempt to demand a feasible change. Another prominent example 
is when the Saudi Arabia government continuously promised that women in the next 
elections would be granted the right to political participation; Saudi Arabian women, 
dissatisfied with government’s failed promises first in 2005 and then in 2011, initiated an 
action and awareness campaign know as “Baladi” (my country). The goal was to achieve 
gender equality by granting Saudi Arabian women political rights through participation in 
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the local Municipal Council elections (Jadaliyya, May 16, 2011). For instance, Baladi 
initiated an online forum for women where individuals could voluntarily participate in 
educational programs that provided necessary information about electoral processes, 
campaigning advice, rules for registration and participation. In 2011 the Baladi initiative 
called for the Ministry of Municipal Affairs to adopt a quota system with at least 500 
seats reserved for women in the coming 2015 elections. However, their campaign 
initiative was ignored (Ackerman and Asquith 2015). In August 2015, the Ministry of 
Municipal and Rural Affairs ended the Baladi initiative based on licensing allegations, 
claiming that the activities of Baladi were not educational but rather commercial, which 
was not true because the educational programs were offered for women free of charge 
(Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain, August 24, 2015). However, 
the Saudi Arabian women who had created the campaign were all from well-off families; 
they were not faced with any criminal charges once their initiative ceased to exist. Hence, 
belonging to certain social class could be beneficial for women as those from upper and 
middle classes face fewer barriers in political participation due to access to education, 
networking, and finance (Henderson and Jeydal 2007, 76). 
Regardless, a majority of Saudi Arabian women value Islamic percepts and tend 
to adhere to Islamic principles. When they speak about the government, they do not 
consider it to be “repressive,” but rather argue that it is the society that halts the 
government’s initiatives (Le Renard 2014, 123). Many Saudi Arabian women voice their 
concerns against the West depicting Saudi Arabians as oppressed. They also argue that 
they do not feel as oppressed; for example, in relation to wearing headscarves, the 
majority of women say they voluntarily choose to wear a scarf. The wearing of 
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headscarves and hiding off feminine parts is a religious obligation, whereas hiding the 
face is simply a discourse of Saudi Arabia’s culture (Le Renard 2014, 122). Regardless, 
Saudi Arabian women’s repression does not stem from following the Islamic percepts, 
but instead it stems from the government’s policies that prevent women’s political and 
civil liberties. Women are oppressed because they do not have an equal access to 
political, economic and social space; they are barred from participation due to legal and 
social barriers. Saudi Arabian women require political consciousness to realize their 
oppression; however, this becomes more difficult since social cultures are often 
intertwined with the religious mores (Le Renard 2014, 61). In Saudi Arabia, drawing a 
line of distinction between religious obligation and cultural obligation is very difficult as 
it varies from family to family and from one religious scholar to another. 
Specific Examples of Repressive Behavior 
In the past, Saudi Arabian women’s rights activists were interrogated, prosecuted, 
and harassed by security services and religious police for peaceful advocacy against 
issues like the driving ban or male guardianship. Today, these issues remain obstacles 
that hinder women’s empowerment in the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia is well known across 
international social media for prosecuting individuals “based solely on their peaceful 
exercise of freedom of expression.” The government of Saudi Arabia condemns public 
demonstrations or gatherings of groups; any attempts are halted by repressive 
mechanisms. For example, female demonstrations in one of the universities in Abha, the 
capital of Asir, were violently suppressed by the authorities. It was reported that about 53 
students were injured (Le Renard 2014, 115). Generally, in Saudi Arabia women are not 
only discriminated against in regards to social, economic and political equality, but they 
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are also banned from voicing concerns in relation to these issues. Thus the government 
has coerced women into the “culture of silence.” For instance, Wajeha al-Huwaider and 
Fawzia al-Ayouni established a campaign known as the “League of Demanders of 
Women’s Rights to Drive Cars” in the form of petitions and peaceful demonstrations 
urging the authorities to permit women to drive. Initially, they were able to attain 
numerous signatures that were then presented to King Abdullah on September 2007. 
Following this on January 2008, the King accepted that women do have the right to drive, 
because religion does not prevent free movement of women but social norms do (Lichter 
2009, 294-295). Nonetheless, in December 2014, these two women were arrested and 
held for 73 days in detention for driving across the Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates borders (Human Rights Watch, November 23, 2015).  
Furthermore, the story of domestic abuse unraveled the culture of silence when 
television presenter Rania al-Baz became the victim of domestic abuse. On April 4 2004, 
she was beaten by her husband and dumped at the hospital entrance. She agreed to make 
her story public in order to bring awareness to the problem of domestic violence that 
exists in Saudi Arabia. Her story shocked the world and the ruling family, who offered 
her moral and financial support. Her husband was sentenced to six months in prison with 
public flogging. She later excused her husband on the condition that he grants her a 
divorce and custody over their two children. Prior to the story of Al-Baz women did not 
report cases of domestic violence. Some conservative Saudi Arabian women scoff 
because Al-Baz portrayed Saudi Arabia as backward when she appeared on the “Oprah 
Winfrey Show,” bringing her private matters not just to the Saudi Arabian public but to 
an international public (Lichter 2009, 289-290). However, her story pushed the Kingdom 
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to implement legal measures against domestic violence and abuse instigated on women. 
Today, although domestic violence is criminalized in the Kingdom, there are no 
enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, women who report these cases are often 
stigmatized and blamed for the abuse. For instance, two Saudi Arabian female human 
rights activists were arrested for a period of ten month for “inciting a women against her 
husband.” Both activists were answering a message they received from Canadian woman 
Natalie Morin who was seeking help because of her abusive husband (Human Rights 
Watch, June 17, 2013). Human Rights Watch concluded that those Saudi Arabian women 
activists who try to stop or report abuses are more likely to get punished than to obtain 
protection or redress. As reported by Amnesty International in 2015, the Kingdom has 
reached its highest record of executions (Human Rights Watch, September 3, 2015). 
Under King Salman, the practice of human rights violations remain intact, political 
activists are jailed, and women’s rights are stagnant. Additionally, the country has 
witnessed a severe increase in executions with 119 individuals receiving death penalties 
in a period of just seven months. 
The Royal Family  
King Abdullah and the rest of the royal family have witnessed the fall of fellow 
dictators in both Tunisia and Egypt. Thus, there are no guarantees that could protect the 
Kingdom from a similar fate, especially at times when Saudi Arabian citizens question 
the legitimacy of their rulers (Yamani 2011, 5). The Saudi Arabian royal family 
constitutes one of the largest royal families in the world, with about 22,000 male 
members comprised of dozens of half brothers, cousins, and nephews (Yamani 2008, 
145). The Kingdom faces an internal power struggle among the factional coalitions of the 
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royal members; each one of them is a potential claimant to the throne. King Abdullah 
failed to appoint his successor i.e. “Second Deputy,” a long tradition of Saudi Arabia 
King’s succession, simply because Abdullah’s authority was considered insufficient 
among the 22,000 members of the royal family. Although the younger generations of 
princes have expressed their hope to rule over the Kingdom, this would be unlikely due to 
the informal rule of seniority, i.e. the elderly get to rule first (Yamani 2010, 10). Perhaps 
if the kingdom finally obtained a young ruler, Saudi Arabian citizens could be better off, 
or this is at least what they hope for.  
The internal relations among the royal family remain highly controversial. The 
former King Abdullah was considered a reformist and was even referred as “a strong 
advocate for women” by the head of the International Monetary Fund Christine Lagarde. 
Yet in spring of 2015, a controversial story about four captive princesses of the Kingdom 
was revealed in the international media. Four Princesses, Jawaher, Sahar, Hala and Maha 
were reported to be living under house arrest in Saudi Arabian royal compounds in the 
town of Jeddah. Their arrest stems from their active support for Saudi Arabian women’s 
equality and rights. Their mother Alanoud al-Fayez, an ex-wife of King Abdullah, resides 
in the United Kingdom. She began a movement on Twitter under the hashtag #FreeThe4, 
asking the Saudi Arabian King to free her four daughters who are held illegitimately in 
captivity under “dreadful” conditions (Tharoor 2015).  
Not surprisingly, members of the royal family quite often become advocates of 
women’s empowerment in Saudi Arabia to gain legitimacy through the support of 
women. The entrepreneurial sector is closely linked with the royal family, and it is 
usually a member of the royal family who promotes and engages in philanthropic work in 
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advancing women’s issues and fighting for women’s freedom. For example, Prince Al 
Waleed bin Talal claimed in an interview: “I will spend whatever God has given me to 
promote the cause of ladies here in Saudi Arabia. Money is not an issue at all” (Le 
Renard 2014, 44-45). Consequently, the Al Waleed bin Talal Foundation is a 
philanthropic arm of HRH Prince Al Waleed bin Talal’s Kingdom Holding Company. 
The foundation promotes Saudi Arabian women’s empowerment, while also working to 
eradicate poverty around the world (Women’s Islamic Initiative, 2015). The Prince is also 
the owner of Rotana TV channel, which features women singers, actresses, and shows 
hosted by Saudi Arabian women. In 2007, LBC presented a show called “More than a 
Woman,” dedicated to Saudi Arabian women and hosted by filmmaker Haifaa Mansour, 
where issues related to gender segregation, women’s immobility and the absence of 
women in the Shura Council were raised for heated debate. As a result, there now exists a 
plethora of women presenters in Saudi Arabian media channels; women leading news, 
entertainment programs and “political discussions” within the limits of what the 
Kingdom allows and tolerates (Hammond 2012, 194-195). 
The media empire owned by the members of the Al-Saud royal family dominates 
the pan-Arab media as well, providing entertainment, political, and religious programs. 
The empire presents Saudi Arabia as liberal, moderate and modern (Hammond 2012, 
189), while also depicting the population of Saudi Arabia as homogenous, and portraying 
a country in which the government does not face internal political pressures (Hammond 
2012, 192). When journalists report about political issues or controversy, they often face 
legal consequences. For example, the Ministry of Interior issues travel bans to prevent 
journalists from traveling abroad, ensuring that unfavorable information does not reach 
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the Western media (Hammond 2012, 196). Many journalists argue that although they feel 
encouraged to report in Saudi Arabian media, they also clearly know the limits and 
boundaries they are not supposed to cross (Hammond 2012, 199).  
One of the survival mechanisms incorporated by the ruling family of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia is the “clientelism” approach to politics. The ruling family is highly 
pluralistic in its views, opinions and attitudes, and operates as a number of modern 
political factions. Each faction tries to allocate resources in order to attract more members 
or clientele to their organization in order to acquire a strong position in the political 
arena. The fragmentation among the royalty permits some choice to Saudi Arabian 
citizens. Most of Saudi Arabian non-governmental organizations established by Saudi 
Arabian elites whose advocacy is in line with women’s rights incorporate a royalty 
patron. For example, the patron allows a charity to bypass certain legislation or 
bureaucracy. Thus, using members of the royalty permits citizens to “get things 
happening” in non-governmental organizations as a fast route to a change (Montagu 
2010, 77).  
As a result, the ruling family of Saudi Arabia is well known for its acts of 
kindness, and these acts in the form of “gifts” are sometimes granted to prevent citizens 
from participating in political activities like political rallies, demonstrations, and protests 
that could undermine stability in the Kingdom. During the events of the “Arab Spring” 
uprisings in 2011, King Abdullah, fearing the spillovers from the unsteady neighboring 
countries, initiated a development fund of $35 billion to help Saudi Arabian nationals 
“buy homes, start business, attain education or get married” in order to halt the possibility 
of popular unrest. Moreover, it became a popular practice among Saudi Arabian Kings to 
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publicize their acts of kindness, such as writing off debts owned by nationals, or initiating 
a release of offenders from jail (NBC News, February 23, 2011). For instance, families of 
political activists would often write to the incumbent King asking for forgiveness and 
requesting that he pardon the offender (Human Rights Watch, June 17, 2013). Similarly, 
the new King Salman, in celebration of his coronation in 2015, declared he would give 
$32 billion to Saudi Arabian citizens despite the falling oil prices. A portion of the 
amount would be distributed among Saudi Arabian employees in the form of a “bonus” to 
their salaries, which was estimated to be “twice a worker’s salary” (Weber 2015). Hence, 
the royal family members continuously engage in neutralizing political opponents and 
dissidents through gifting and patronage. Moreover, the ruling family of Saudi Arabia 
applies the same strategy to the international reporters and the media, buying favorable 
media coverage. For instance, WikiLeaks published communication between the Saudi 
Arabian government and Kingdom’s embassies, revealing Saudi Arabia’s efforts to 
improve its image abroad (Sputnik International, September 17, 2015). 
As a result, a lot of pro-women’s rights activists took their protests against the 
government’s discriminatory polices to social media. For example, Eman Al-Nafjan 
advocates for political reform in her blog Saudiwoman’s weblog. In her Twitter account 
she promotes political transformation, and her message reads: “What most agree on 
across liberal and Islamist factions, is more like a Norwegian model – a constitutional 
monarchy with an elected PM and parliament and a welfare system that reflects how rich 
the country is” (Rifai 2014, 502). Conversely, the Internet also provides the means for 
Wahhabi clerics to articulate their messages to broader audience. Due to a plethora of 
Saudi Arabian clerics and competition among them, each establishes his own website 
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where he provides religious opinions to public. Saudi Arabian citizens are dependent 
upon the opinions of religious scholars, and because of competition among the clerics, 
Saudi Arabians often engage in cherry picking to find a particular cleric with whose 
views they intend to agree most (Hammond 2012, 17). Saudi Arabian clerics therefore 
remain extremely powerful and are able to exert a lot of influence in the society.  
As aforementioned evidence shows, the Saudi Arabian state controls society 
through repression and fear, while the Wahhabi fundamentalists control society through 
an ideology. The abundance of oil permitted the government of Saudi Arabia to suppress 
both civil and political liberties and enforce Wahhabi ideology. Oil wealth allowed the 
government to impose strict gender segregation policies that further inhibited women’s 
access to political, economic and social space. Meanwhile, policies of male guardianship 
reinforced patriarchy, disenfranchised women, and increased their dependence upon male 
guardians. Continuous marginalization of Saudi Arabian women by the state and the 
religious police pushed women to mobilize their efforts in attempt to demand social 
change. This time Saudi Arabian women’s efforts were not left unnoticed, as the ruling 
family finally granted women political space. Perhaps because Saudi Arabian women’s 
efforts at some point were presumed threatening to the internal legitimacy and stability of 
the regime, the rulers of the Kingdom granted women the right to political participation. 
Yet, when women raise the slightest discontent in regards to state’s policies, they are 
subjected to harassment and inhumane punishments. Thus Saudi Arabian women’s 
political participation involves many limitations. 
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December 2015 Elections 
With the new political concessions, many Saudi Arabian women activists were 
predicting that no women would be voted into office due to discriminatory policies that 
were established by the government to limit women from participation. Human Rights 
Watch stated that women voters faced multiple barriers during the registration process 
(September 3, 2015). The government established “single-sex voter registration centers, 
but only one third were devoted to women” (Aldosari 2015). To be eligible to cast a vote, 
women were asked to present their national identification cards, which is problematic as 
the majority of women carry family identification cards. Another constraint women faced 
was providing proof of residency, which is difficult as Saudi Arabian women generally 
do not own property or pay utility bills due to the law of male guardianship. In order to 
be eligible to participate in the elections, women had to prove their relation to the 
property holder through family ID cards, which are often in the hands of male guardians. 
In order to obtain an ID card, women were required to report to district clerics with 
necessary residency documents that were not easily accessible or available (Aldosari 
2015). Moreover, men could always block women’s aspirations and will for political 
participation (Barker 2015).  
Not surprisingly, even though women were granted political participation in 
regards to voting, most women were reluctant to use this opportunity in the 2015 
Municipal Council Elections. The lack of women’s political participation is explained by 
some scholars in terms of women being passive actors in regards to politics. Others 
propose that the low turnout of women is due to their family responsibilities. Women 
who did participate in the political apparatus were usually from a highly educated social 
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class (Henderson and Jeydal 2007, 9). Nevertheless, historically the rate of women’s 
political empowerment in the world remained low. Obstacles to women’s political 
participation include access to finances and education, presence of social networks, and 
flexibility with time (Henderson and Jeydal 2007). In Saudi Arabia many female 
candidates were disqualified due to insufficient documentations, and they were further 
unable to appeal due to the short two-week electoral period (Aldosari 2015). Moreover, 
women candidates expressed dissatisfaction with the review board; some complained that 
they were unjustly removed from participation. For instance, women writers and activists 
for human rights were unfairly disqualified from candidacy. Thus the background of each 
woman candidate was thoroughly pre-checked upon application to ensure that only “safe 
candidates” were permitted to stand in elections (Aldosari 2015). Others had an 
insufficient budget to finance their campaigning platform. Some candidates in Saudi 
Arabia, like Al-Sadah from the town of Qatif, had very little budget for campaigning and 
her campaign activities were set off in her own house where both male and female 
colleagues helped her develop a strategy for spreading her campaign message (Gorney 
2016).  
Other obstacles in women’s political participation involved strict campaign 
regulations that banned women from directly addressing male voters except through a 
male representative or guardian, and regulations preventing women from attaching their 
personal images when campaigning (Aldosari 2015). Hence, cultural barriers are another 
explanation for women’s lack of access to political power (Henderson and Jeydal 2007, 
15). The better the social attitude towards women’s political participation, the more likely 
women are able to access the office. Another limitation in Saudi Arabia that prevented 
46 
women candidates from securing votes was the lack of Saudi Arabian women voters’ 
enthusiasm in participation. On the designated election day, Saudi Arabian women were 
reluctant to register to cast their votes due to the cumbersome registration process. 
Women thought that it was a lot of effort to vote for candidates “in position of no 
consequence,” because their decisions were in the end only consultative with no actual 
power of influence (Gorney 2016). Often in many cultures political positions are 
associated with masculinity, and women are seen as too politically passive and dependent 
for them to be considered for a position. However, when women are able to exhibit 
appropriate traits, then the society views them as deviant or abnormal (Henderson and 
Jeydal 2007, 17). Society often believes that a woman’s political position would interfere 
with her family obligations. Consequently, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia publically 
scolded women for aspiring for political power, and in his televised speech he 
encouraged Saudi Arabian voters not to cast votes in favor of female candidates. There 
were other incidents of cultural discontent; for example, men tearing banners that listed 
names of female candidates of their tribe (Aldosari, 2015).  
It is odd that in a society with restrictions against women in law, employment, and 
education the government of Saudi Arabia holds open elections in which women have the 
right to vote and stand in elections. In a society where women witness numerous barriers 
on a daily basis – Wahhabism, patriarchy and traditional gender roles – the Saudi Arabian 
government created a political space for women. Hence, in the next chapter, to 
understand why authoritarian states sometime behave in this manner (i.e. permitting 
and/or repressing political freedoms), I will look into the question more closely with the 
help of theories of political repression, political participation, and women in politics. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORIES 
In this chapter I will examine theories of political repression and political 
participation that are relevant to my study in the context of authoritarian states. I perceive 
that the level of political repression will determine the level of political freedoms granted 
to citizens; if citizens feel they are limited in their expression and participation in the 
affairs of the state, then most likely it is because such states use repression to coerce 
citizens into submissive rule. Particularly, I hold that two theories could guide me in my 
quest to find the attitudes and feelings of Saudi Arabian women who are trying to 
advance women’s rights in the Kingdom: the theory of political repression and political 
participation. If Saudi Arabian women refrain from expressing their opinions despite the 
new opening, then it is possible that political repression is still prevalent in the state, 
which limits Saudi Arabian women’s participation. In order to understand the functioning 
of an authoritarian state and how women's political participation fits into it, I will 
describe theories of political repression, political participation, and women in politics.  
Authoritarian governments often grant some political participation to citizens in 
order to withstand popular dissatisfaction, which could yield political unrest (Ottaway 
and Choucair-Vizoso 2008, 53). In the Middle East, Arab leaders often establish 
democratic arrangements, one of which is granting women an active role in the realm of 
politics and governance. Such arrangements are usually limited in scope and incorporate 
hidden agendas of the ruling elite; for example, under former Egyptian President Hosni 
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Mubarak, positions in the Egyptian National Council for Women were distributed to 
regime loyalists, i.e. the elite women (Dawoud 2012, 160). This does not serve as a 
guarantee of actual democratic reform; instead, it may reinforce elitism and clientelism in 
the political system. Therefore, the political systems of the world are not homogenous; 
many Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes implement or mimic some democratic 
arrangements perhaps for the purpose of regime survival in order to withstand popular 
unrest by gaining internal legitimacy. Scholars in the literature propose that one possible 
reason behind the survival of an authoritarian state is the absence of an independent and 
active civil society that operates outside the control of the ruling class. State controlled 
media and repressive strategies carried out by governments against civil activists also 
contribute to the trend (Diamond 1994).  
Political Repression 
Political repression is defined as maltreatment of individuals for the purpose of 
limiting or forbidding their ability to take part in the political life of society. The 
oppressive state that seeks to subordinate individuals to the state’s authority limits their 
freedom and participation in non-institutional efforts for demanding social, cultural, 
economic or political change (Earl 2011, 262). Repression undermines political and civil 
liberties, and it tends to eliminate independent media, ban informal gatherings, and 
discourage social movements. Thus repression serves as a sign of a state’s power or the 
accumulation of a state’s strength. Charles Tilly (1978) has defined political repression 
broadly as actions that force protests to be expensive. The relationship between political 
dissent and repression is considered to be direct and linear (Davenport 1995, 684); the 
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repressive efforts of the state increase with the increase of dissident behaviors against the 
state. The type of dissident behavior – i.e. whether it is violent or nonviolent conflict 
behavior – determines the state’s “repressive propensity”” (Hibbs 1973; Gupta et al. 
1993). Thus the threat posed by political dissidents ought to be analyzed in 
multidimensional ways, i.e. in accordance with the degree of threat perceived. 
Nevertheless, multidimensional threat perception is not universal; it varies across the 
political-economic dynamics of each state (Davenport 1995, 707). Repression is directly 
in line with authoritarian political systems.  
Stephan Linz’s classification of authoritarian regimes includes sultanism - a 
highly personalistic and unconstrained leadership (1978, 46) where the ruling elite is not 
constrained by interest groups, law or ideology. Supporters of the ruler are granted 
rewards for their loyalty, while others “submit in fear” (Linz 1978, 48). Loyalty to the 
sultan is expressed through total submission (Linz, 1978, 45). In such regimes, 
independent and autonomous institutions become almost nonexistent; instead, they are 
the personal property of the sultan. Social organizations become either constrained by 
policies that disallow political activity, or become entirely banned. Meanwhile, 
abundance of natural endowments helps the sultan to maintain control over the 
population. Sulantistic regimes are termed as a “disorganized form of despotism” which 
sustains itself through terror (Linz 1978, 45). Such regimes fear rebellion from the 
population; hence they instigate violence in order to suppress rebellious attempts 
(Valentino, Huth, and Lindsey 2004). The security forces of sultanistic regimes often 
implement “selective violence” – i.e. the use of torture – to obtain confession for 
 50 
denunciations, followed by targeting dissident individuals who pose a threat or incite the 
crowd against the regime (Kalyvas 2006). When governments hold strict control over 
their populations through security and intelligence forces, the likelihood of citizens’ 
defection becomes minimal due to fear of surveillance and coercion (Kalyvas 2006).  
Such regimes are likely to undergo a revolutionary overthrow at some point in 
history (Goodwin 2001). According to Ted Gurr (1986, 24), who predicted that the 
“capacity of coercive apparatus of the state is the direct result of chronic war 
participation,” reliance on repression increases when perception of external threat 
increases; the more insecure the state feels, the more likely it is to use torture in order to 
control dissident behavior (1986, 24). States often deploy repression against violent 
opposition groups to signal that such behavior will not be tolerated. A state justifies its 
repressive tactics as legitimate because these tactics are directed against dissidents whose 
behavior is deemed dangerous and threatening to the wellbeing of the population 
(Devenport 1995, 78). Once the state implements repression to halt political instability, 
the state “becomes habituated into using” such mechanisms. The extent of repression 
implemented changes based on two factors: 1) different attributes of the conflict behavior 
encountered, and 2) the structure of the political economy (Davenport 1995, 684). States’ 
repressive tactics are not uniform, but rather peculiar to the conflict context – i.e., based 
upon the state’s experiences with domestic unrest. It is expected that political repression 
will neutralize political opponents, or at least increase the costs of dissent. Most of the 
literature draws upon casual linkages in which the costs of dissent become so large that it 
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is no longer viewed as worthwhile goal by the political opponents (Gurr 1986; 
Kowalewski 1992). 
The state establishes a repressive arm for the purpose of “war making, extraction, 
or state building.” In order to understand the use of repression by the state, one ought to 
understand the available mechanisms of “resistance;” without resistance from the 
populace or rival elite, there is no obstacle in the path of the state (Krain 2000, 14). In the 
absence of viable opposition forces, or prospects for “anti-status quo,” the politics are 
monopolized by a single hegemonic power (Del Aguila 1984, 139). States are ruled by 
rational elites who deploy necessary means to acquire desirable outcomes. The elite may 
engage in eliminating or neutralizing their rivals, ensuring protection for their supporters, 
and engage in extraction of resources. States whose elites face no accountability become 
“predatory” because they hold a monopoly of legitimate use of power that could be 
directed for extraction of resources from the populace (Levi 1981). In either case, 
resources are needed for the purpose of cooptation or repression; those who are in support 
of the incumbent elites are rewarded, while the challengers are punished. Repression is 
useful because it increases the costs for opposition to challenge the state (Krain 2000, 
17). The repression capabilities of a state are strongest in a post-conflict environment; 
therefore, states are likely to apply such capabilities. Accommodation, even though a 
viable capability of a state, would be perceived as more costly. Elites that feel 
unthreatened by the existing challengers tend to survive without the need for 
appeasement or accommodation. These elites feel that they do not require the support of 
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the opposition groups in order to remain in power. Hence, those elites that feel secure or 
invulnerable are most likely to use the repressive mechanisms (Krain 2000, 19).  
The population, although dissatisfied with the oppressive state, will refrain from 
openly confronting the state because such confrontation against the incumbent regime 
would incur high risks. These risks are associated with various “opportunity costs” that 
each individual would have to bear – e.g., wages, time, repression, imprisonment, or 
death. Ideology will not be enough to convince individuals to join the rebellion; selective 
incentives have to be granted in order to encourage greater participation. Selective 
incentives – e.g. payments to compensate for economic hardship, power, or future 
promise of better inclusivity in the new system if the movement was successful – may be 
used to push citizens to participate. Due to the existence of competition among regime 
supporters and dissidents, each actor could offer more compelling incentives for 
collective action; e.g., the regime could issue payments to counter the offer made by the 
dissident group (Lichbach 1994). Dissidents of the regime ought to have access to 
resources for recruitment of individuals; they should be able to pay for the risks incurred 
by the participants. Hence, the use of repression by the state prevents opposition groups 
from mobilizing their resources effectively against the state. Repression increases the 
costs of collective action for each individual participant.  
On the contrary, scholars argue that there is a “paradox” – excessive or 
indiscriminate use of repression by the state pushes previously neutral individuals to 
mobilize or participate in social movement against the state. Gurr and Duvall found that 
coercive tactics lead to political instability by breeding civil conflict (1986; 106).  A 
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repressive environment increases collective action spirit by “overcoming social 
cleavages, strengthening collective identity and rearranging groups into unitary whole” 
(Krain 2000, 107). Others have found that the level of state repression matters; for 
instance, a high level of repression increases violent mobilization but decreases non-
violent mobilization (Krain 2000, 107). On the other hand, if a state decides instead to 
accommodate opposition groups then this could signal state’s vulnerability, which could 
push previously unengaged opponents to mobilize (Krain 2000,109). Therefore, political 
repression is specific to challenges and threats posed by the individuals prior to 
administering repression, and the state’s analysis of whether benefits obtained from such 
measures overweigh the costs. Due to the costs of repression, the state may instead 
engage in selective violence, targeting particular dissidents that the state deems most 
threatening (Boudreau 2004, 23). States uncertain of the capacity of the opposition 
groups would likely identify and target the most dangerous opponents, i.e. the opposition 
elites (McCormick 1988). Nonetheless, political opponents develop new mechanisms for 
adaptation, creating alternate ways to channel organization against the state (Fatton 
1991). At certain times political defectors and the frustrated populace may cooperate and 
unite their efforts against the incumbent regime (Boudreau 2004, 26). Political 
opportunists evaluate the cost of rebellion; state weakness increases the chance for 
rebellion to be successful. Thus different forms of repression “promote specific logic of 
opportunity” (Bourdeau 2004, 29). For instance, Bourdeau argued in his cross-country 
analysis of state repression among three case studies (Burma, Indonesia and Philippines)  
that activists adapt their collective action against the state by acknowledging limits to 
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their activities, i.e., the amount of rebellion the state will tolerate before resorting to 
violence. In the case of the Philippines, the government tolerated legal protests from the 
opposition groups (2004, 161). Meanwhile, in Burma and Indonesia, state use of violence 
pushed some regime dissidents to seek alliance with the incumbent government for the 
sake of protection and survival (Bourdeau 2004, 248).  
In sum, the authoritarian state implements repressive mechanisms to curb 
citizens’ civil and political freedoms. The state perceives citizens’ political participation 
as a threat to the regime’s legitimacy. Therefore, in a repressive regime, citizens submit 
in fear because open confrontation with the state may lead to harassment and detention. 
In such societies, citizens are banned from expressing political views that do not conform 
to the repressive state’s ideology. Political dissidents are punished or neutralized by the 
state, which further enforces paranoia or fear among the population who are pushed away 
from participation in social and rebellious movements.    
Political Participation 
Political participation is defined as legal activities instituted by the citizens in 
order to exert pressure and influence governmental personnel to take particular actions or 
to adopt particular policies that citizens deem favorable (Nie and Verba 1975, 1). 
Political participation is the direct or indirect methods that citizens use to convey 
preference, need, or concern to political actors, and they do so voluntarily (Nie and Verba 
1975, 1). Other scholars have proposed a broader definition of political participation, 
terming it as ‘an umbrella concept’ that should incorporate activities directed towards 
both political figures and non-political figures who could exert influence. Political 
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participation is categorized as those activities that use non-violent means to exert 
influence upon governmental officials; other activities such as riots or assassinations are 
considered illegal means of political participation. Nevertheless, political participation is 
contingent upon political culture, which in turn is dependent upon the type of political 
system. For instance, what may be considered permissible aspects of political 
participation in democracies could be deemed as conspiracy or sedition in authoritarian 
systems (Nie andVerba 1975, 3). The current literature examines citizens’ political 
participation only within the realm of democratic regimes. The literature holds that only 
citizens belonging to countries that are democracies could exert influence upon political 
actors through political participation (Albrecht 2008, 15). However, such focus is too 
narrow because citizens of authoritarian governments, too, are able to participate 
politically. Political participation and political activism exist in every political system 
(Albrecht 2008, 15). Most citizens are unable to evaluate the actual consequences of their 
actions; some may even “damage their own best long-run interests by ill-conceived short-
range demands” (Lippmann 1965). Nonetheless, citizens can influence their governments 
to adopt certain policies: they can either communicate their preferences through 
information, or they can exert pressure upon political leaders (Nie and Verba 1975, 7). 
Because individuals need to commit time and resources for political participation, 
participation incurs costs. Voting is regarded as the least expensive method of political 
participation for citizens, yet such a measure may be deceiving (Nie and Verba 1975, 2). 
For example, studies across Egypt and Jordan showed that voters were lured to the polls 
to cast their votes for an electoral candidate who had promised certain services and 
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provisions upon victory. Another study on Iran demonstrated that voters were forced to 
the polls to acquire a stamp on their identification cards without which they would be 
denied access to governmental or health services. High voter turnout in these countries 
was a manipulation (Lust-Okar 2008, 7). 
In short, political participation is based upon those who take the initiative or 
opportunity to influence the current status quo. There is a thin line between political and 
non-political participation, which is often diffused. However, non-political activity could 
initiate or contribute to later political activity; e.g., enhancing skills through volunteering, 
establishing networks of contacts, or exposing oneself to different political views. 
Political activities are those that require citizens’ commitment – for example, working for 
electoral campaigns, contacting government officials, protesting, participating in a 
boycott, or making donations (Verba, Schlozhan, and Brady 1995). Similarly, boycotting 
a certain type of product, which is very common in Europe, or wearing a badge with a 
political message could be an example of citizens’ political participation (Teorell, Torcal, 
and Moniero 2007). Non-violent protests are another example of political participation, 
yet on average only a small number of people engage in these activities, although they 
communicate a message to governmental officials “loudly and clearly” (Nie and Verba 
1975, 27).  
Political participation should not be limited to public figures or political officials; 
rather, it should include all private citizens who have the capacity to exert influence. This 
is especially relevant to the political context of the Middle East (Albrecht 2008, 23). 
Among the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, informal institutions such as 
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local grassroots organizations and Islamist groups exert influences upon the political 
realm. Islamist groups are extremely powerful, as they not only exert pressure but also 
channel citizens’ participation through mobilization. Islamist groups often operate as 
“shadow states” offering services ranging from charitable, educational, social and cultural 
tasks to their members (Albrecht 2008, 23). For instance, in Egypt, despite the initial 
governmental ban against the Islamic activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, there still 
exists a strong Islamic sector that operates politically in parallel with the Egyptian 
government. The sector includes private mosques, Islamic private schools, businesses, 
and volunteer associations that together support the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Blaydes and El Tarouty 2009, 364). Another example of an informal institution is 
diwaniyya, which carves space for adult men to engage in political participation through 
an informal gathering. Such indigenous institutions have been transformed into modern 
informal assemblies in many Gulf countries (Alhamad 2008, 44). Likewise, in Bahrain 
people gather in private homes called majlis in order to foster political discussions and 
address certain grievances of the constituency (Niethammer 2008, 149). Hence, the 
availability and coexistence of informal and formal institutions affects political process 
and leads to political consequences (Zerhouni 2008, 126).  
 There are numerous studies conducted by scholars to evaluate the effect of 
different forms of political participation across countries. For example, a group of 
scholars conducted a cross-cultural study and found that boycotting products is the most 
common type of political participation among the Scandinavian countries (Teorell, 
Torcal, and Moniero 2007). Scholars in the literature also found that in the United States 
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direct means of political participation such as voting are in decline because more 
Americans prefer to express their political participation in the form of financial 
contributions. Furthermore, technological innovation has brought about new dimensions 
for political participation; i.e., citizens are able to use unconventional mechanisms in 
order to influence electoral outcomes (Guillion 2009). The emergence of the Internet has 
created new opportunities for political engagement (Baumgartner and Morris 2010), as it 
provides citizens with other means of political activism such as signing petitions, 
contacting politicians, or following political parties on social media networks (McAdam 
and Tarrow 2010). Online political participation empowers youth who often feel 
disengaged from offline (i.e. conventional) means of political participation (Oser 2013). 
It further lowers the costs of gathering information about political parties, and of 
communicating information to public (Tolbert and McNeal 2003). The availability and 
the use of the Internet improves the technical skills of the participants and mobilizes 
previously disengaged citizens (Kruger 2002). For instance, authoritarian regimes of the 
Arab world limit public spaces for citizens, thus indirectly inhibiting citizen’s political 
participation. Many citizens therefore resort to alternate channels to express their 
willingness for and commitment to political activism, such as underground informal 
networks or participation via the Internet. Internet blogging has become very popular 
especially among the Gulf countries due to restrictions imposed on freedom of the press 
and the widespread fear of repression. In addition, Internet blogging has become 
popularized among Islamic clerics; for instance, in Bahrain Shiite villages run their own 
news and religious blogs. Internet activism across Arab states is widespread, despite the 
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fact that the secret services monitor Internet activity for signs of defamation of the 
government (Niethammer 2008, 147). 
Therefore, the only channel that is available for Arab citizens to exert influence 
upon the political elites is via this unconventional political participation, which is 
becoming more prevalent today. The Internet provides space for citizens of authoritarian 
states to express their political dissatisfaction more explicitly (Sakr 2004, 142). For 
instance, the Internet becomes a virtual arena for public debate, information sharing, and 
shaming of the political elites. The Internet also generates gender equality, as both men 
and women can openly voice their concerns through engagement in online debates (Oser 
2013). For example, the Internet provides information to women about women’s rights in 
other countries, and grants connections to global organizations whose advocacy is in line 
with women’s rights (Sakr 2004, 144). In short, the Internet provides a channel for the 
Arab citizens to publically express their views and criticize the elites for certain policies 
without risking state sponsored backlash. However, authoritarian states impose greater 
restrictions upon citizens’ use of the Internet to limit political activity. For example, in 
2014 Qatar passed a cybercrime law that imposed greater control over the published 
content across social media and websites. The law bans the spreading of information that 
may depict “false news” or undermine the “general social order” in the state, and 
violators may face up to three years of imprisonment (Freedom House 2015). Such laws 
further inhibit citizens’ willingness to participate politically because there is always a risk 
of imprisonment, and a rational individual would not dare to jeopardize his/her freedom.  
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In sum, political participation is a broad concept that incorporates different forms 
of participation by which citizens can exert influence upon the political elites. Citizens’ 
political participation is important because it creates a culture of accountability – 
dissatisfied citizens may express their concern for a policy that they deem unfavorable. 
Although political participation exists in every political system, the extent to which 
citizens are able to influence political actors varies across different political systems. In 
the Arab world, citizens are more constrained in political participation due to strict 
authoritarianism that curbs political activism. Yet Arab citizens have discovered a niche 
with the establishment of the Internet, one that permits both Arab women and men to 
engage in political debate and express their political dissatisfaction.   
Women’s Political Participation 
Women’s political participation is broadly defined as the extent to which women 
are represented in, participate in, and exert influence in political decision-making. The 
definition also encompasses women’s mobilization and participation efforts through civil 
society movements (Falch 2010). Participation in civil society movements allows women 
to exert influence and pressure political actors to adopt a favorable policy that would 
enhance women’s equality and rights in the country. The current literature indicates 
several ways in which women could voice their concerns politically, including electoral 
suffrage and women’s parliamentary quotas. Political representation through women’s 
quota systems is a modern phenomenon, which became prominent only in the middle of 
the twentieth century. Notably, women’s electoral suffrage was evident from as early as 
the nineteenth century. At first, women were excluded from political rights based on 
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assumption that they were incapable of independent action in the field of politics 
(Prezworski 2009). Nonetheless, studies show that increasing women’s political 
participation leads the way to democratic transition (Baldez 2003; Baker 2014; Paxton et 
al. 2010). The process of deliberation is inherited through democratization, as it ensures 
the bargaining process between actors driven by their self-interest. In making decisions, 
actors initially take into account the interests of others as democratic framework 
presumes accountability to the rest of the society, especially in regards to actors’ 
positions and actions (Barnett and Zuercher 2009). Ruling elites often tend to camouflage 
their personal interests when initiating certain policies, but due to substantial societal and 
international pressure, the elite feels compelled to consider alternative interests. Hence, 
the extension of women’s political rights revolves around the elite’s decisions, especially 
at times of immanent threat of political revolt posed by the excluded (Prezworski 2009). 
For instance, the elite extends rights to women out of loss of political legitimacy or when 
women pose a credible threat to the ruling elite. As seen in Chile and South Africa, to 
divert power from the incumbent regime the opposition elite supported women’s 
autonomous organizations in order to pull their votes, and in addition they lobbied 
women into political positions (Molyneux 1998). The elite prefers to bear these costs in 
order to avoid the possibility of revolution. Hence, as argued earlier, women’s political 
participation becomes permissible when implemented by the incumbent elite. 
Women’s political participation in a society matters globally because women 
make up about half of the population of the majority of countries. Through representation 
women are granted a voice, which enables them to implement and promote policies that 
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would advance women’s political interest and rights nationally. Political representation 
for women is often established through quotas, in which women must make up a certain 
percentage or number in the political system (The implementation of quotas, 2005, 164). 
The driving force behind the implementation of quotas is to promote women’s inclusion 
in the decision-making process. One type of quota, which is often implemented by 
authoritarian regimes, is the reserved seat; reserved seats for women are enlisted by the 
constitution or legislation. Today more countries that had previously excluded women 
from politics implement “quotas as a fast track” for initiation of democratic façade (The 
implementation of quotas, 2005, 164). More often, authoritarian regimes implement 
quotas to mimic a democratic reform. For example, the former King Abdullah of Saudi 
Arabia personally appointed thirty women, about 20 percent, in the Shura Council. The 
Council is an advisory body that closely resembles parliaments, and in total there are 150 
members in the council (Henderson and Jeydal, 2007 32). However, such a quota does 
not necessarily lead to a change in political outcomes, as women still remain a voiceless 
minority in the male dominated political arena.  
The literature in regards to women’s quotas is divided into two camps: those who 
argue that quotas are effective, and those who disagree. Overall the literature highlights a 
positive trend between the increase in women’s political participation through quota 
systems and the democratic system of governance (Gray 2003; Yoon 2001; Baldez 2003; 
Baker 2014; Paxton et al. 2010). Many women activists in the Gulf countries advocate 
and press their government to adopt women’s quotas across governmental agencies. 
Meanwhile, scholars also have indicated that simply introducing women’s quotas does 
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not signify a country’s commitment to gender equality or to democracy. Hence, quota 
systems do not halt the problems with democratic deficiency. For instance, a case study 
on Sudan’s implementation of a threshold of 25 percent of women’s quotas provides 
evidence that in the absence of institutional reform, i.e. an independent parliament from 
the executive branch, feminists are unable to raise their concerns (Tonnessen 2011). 
 Similarly, a comparative study on women’s quotas across Chile and Argentina 
confirmed that women’s quotas increased political representation, but the study 
disconfirmed that women actually had an influence in promoting or advancing women’s 
political interests nationally. In addition, the study argued that the effectiveness of 
women’s quotas depends upon a number of influencing factors such as the type of 
electoral system – proportional or majoritarian – the number of districts, and types of 
parties. Argentina implemented quotas at the national level with a ceiling of 30 percent 
threshold, whereas in Chile political parties independently grant women some 
representation (Gray 2003). Thus the scholarly literature has advanced the perception that 
proportional representative (PR) electoral systems are better in representing women than 
the majoritarian systems. This is due to the fact that PR tends to have a greater district 
magnitude, thus increasing chances for women’s inclusivity when the total number of 
memberships per district increase (Jalalzai 2010). Another study comparing women’s 
political representation argued that political stability and the backing of a male political 
elite allowed the successful implementation of women’s quotas in Samoa but not in 
Papua New Guinea (Baker 2014). Nonetheless, the most comprehensive cross-sectional 
study was carried out by Paxton et al. (2010). In this study, the growth of women’s 
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political representation was examined across 110 countries between the time periods of 
1975 to 2000. They predicted that growth in democracy would always increase women’s 
political representation with time. Instead, they found that the presence of gender quotas 
in a country does not necessitate an increase in women’s political representation. Finally, 
in the last measure of the electoral system, mainly proportional representation proved that 
it had no effect on growth.  
Furthermore, literature suggests that three factors lead to women’s mobilization: 
organizational networks, connection with international feminism, and exclusion from the 
political arena. Conversely, if governments are responsive and allow some political rights 
to women, then women become reluctant to mobilize themselves against their 
governments (Baldez 2003). Research on Latin America showed that women’s 
mobilization is a significant requisite in overthrowing the authoritarian regime during the 
transitional period (Waylen 2007). However, in the aftermath of transition both in Chile 
and Brazil, women’s political representation was stagnant despite their initial efforts 
(Alvarez 1990). The factor that could increase women’s participation actually contributes 
to authoritarianism:  this entails incumbent elites that advance women’s political 
participation through quotas in order to remain in power unchallenged. The incumbent 
elite implements women’s quotas as a cosmetic democratic reform that does not improve 
the quality of democracy in the country. Women’s quotas are minimal in scope, and 
further reinforce democratic deficit because they represent a limited number of women 
from the top of the social hierarchy such as women from elitist backgrounds with status 
and nepotistic linkages. 
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Recently, more authoritarian governments of the Middle East have been willing to 
incorporate women into traditionally male dominant politics, mainly through the 
introduction of quota systems. As evidence from the literature showed, women’s quotas 
carve out a limited space in the political environment, but in reality women do not inhibit 
actual power and remain a voiceless minority. Women candidates who acquire 
emancipation through quota systems are usually drawn out of urban cities, and these 
women are often well educated and have social ties to the ruling male officials. At times 
of political opportunity, elite women tend to abandon women’s organizations for a 
membership in the parliament and the state. Thus elite women are no longer able to 
represent the vast interests of women’s movements. In addition, as part of the political 
apparatus, elite women lose their autonomy and capacity to criticize governmental 
policies that reinforce gender biases (Matear 1999). Similarly, when acquiring 
representation in the national parliament women might foster clientelisms such as seeking 
assistance from the incumbent elite in order to lobby for a position. For instance, the 
Saudi Arabian political sphere is organized through clientelistic linkages with a high level 
of nepotism as some female candidates have obtained seats through wasta (personal 
connections). In reality, countries of the world barely qualify for meeting the threshold of 
women’s quotas of 30 percent. Rwanda is perhaps the only rare case that had exceeded 
the minimum threshold in 2013 by increasing women’s quotas to about 61 percent. 
Hence, Rwanda is an outlier because the high political participation of women was the 
consequence of the civil war; the male population has been reduced.  
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Regardless, when women are barred from their civic rights, they often become 
victims of the state’s discriminatory policies that reinforce patriarchal social norms. Such 
norms limit women’s ability to stand up for themselves, discouraging them from 
speaking up in order to claim their natural civic rights. In Saudi Arabia, there are social 
norms that encourage women to pursue early marriages at the expense of education or 
professional careers. Generally, some conservative Saudi Arabian families distinguish 
only two roles for women (being a mother and a wife), subjecting them to “natural” 
responsibilities (Kangas, Haider, and Fraser 2014, 8.). Likewise, the legal and judicial 
systems play an important role in the society as they enforce laws and regulate people’s 
access to resources, status, and basic civic rights. Legal enforcement systems in Saudi 
Arabia are dominated by conservative men who are apathetic to women, thus the system 
often fails to defend or even recognize the basic rights of Saudi Arabian women. 
Meanwhile, due to the subordinated positions of women within the patriarchal society, 
women have limited access to national legal systems. Because of structural inequalities 
and gender biases, they face discriminatory policies in regards to property entitlement 
and family law. Saudi Arabian judges often frown upon women reporting sensitive issues 
such as domestic violence and abuse. The majority holds that such matters ought to be 
kept private (Kangas, Haider, and Fraser 2014, 23). In Islamic jurisprudence women are 
expected to be obedient to their husbands, thus when a woman defies these duties there is 
legal justification for abuse such as beating (Tonnessen 2016, 15). Similarly, laws in the 
case of divorce are gender biased, as women can claim only if there is a valid reason to 
seek divorce (Kangas, Haider, and Fraser 2014, 67). Under certain circumstances divorce 
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serves as the last resort to marital problems. In the view of Saudi Arabian judges, divorce 
is the “prerogative of men,” i.e., women do not hold an absolute right to claim divorce. 
The justification is based on the perception that women are more emotional and tend to 
lose their tempers quickly, which could trigger them to seek divorce, undermining the 
stability of a marriage. However, women are permitted to initiate divorce in a few 
situations, such as due to a husband’s impotence (Al-Rasheed 2013, 129).  
In such societies, women ought to be politically active. The presence of women in 
political institutions is crucial, as only through having a voice can women break through 
subordination by advancing policies that enforce equality and women’s rights. Political 
decisions directly affect the lives of women. For quite a long time women’s issues have 
been rarely addressed, ignored, or forgotten; therefore it is important to incorporate 
women in the political apparatus. Scholars have proposed that when women are elected 
into political office, they are more likely to advance women’s issues and address 
women’s concerns, especially those related to health care, security, education and welfare 
(Henderson and Jaydal 2007, 7-8). Nevertheless, while some countries in the GCC have 
made considerable progress towards women’s political equality, others have not. In Saudi 
Arabia the progress towards women’s political equality was initiated by the general 
consensus among the masculine elites within the monarchy. Hence, political participation 
remains a non-exclusive aspect of democratic regimes; it can evolve somewhat in the 
authoritarian regimes as well. 
In sum, women’s political participation entails women’s access to the political 
realm via the electoral suffrage or quota. Access to the political decision-making process 
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grants women the ability to produce a favorable change that could enhance women’s 
equality and rights, ending discriminatory policies and improving women’s overall 
position in the society. Hence it is important that women are included within the political 
realm. However, women’s political participation globally remains slow, and the extent of 
such participation varies across different political systems. Authoritarian states of the 
Arab world, through the initiation of the political elite, grant women political space, but 
this often implies limitations – in reality, women hold no actual power and remain 
voiceless.  
Conclusion and Questions 
Overall we learned from the literature on political participation that this concept is 
a broad concept that incorporates both direct and indirect means of participation by which 
citizens can influence political actors. We also know that citizens’ political participation 
varies across different political systems; in democracies, political participation is more 
open and direct, while in authoritarian systems, political participation is limited and 
indirect. Hence, political participation is not only conducive to democracies, and does 
occur within the realm of authoritarian regimes although its expression is limited. There 
are two ways in which political participation is expressed under the framework of 
authoritarian regimes: through initiation by the government, and through the citizens’ use 
of unconventional means of participation. The latter presumes that citizens can use the 
Internet to channel their dissatisfaction and exert pressure upon the political elites, while 
the former option holds that political participation is made available through the elite’s 
initiation.  
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Authoritarian leaders may introduce democratic reforms, one of which is granting 
women an active role in the realm of politics and governance. However, does this mean, 
for example, that seventeen Saudi Arabian women admitted as councilors into the 
Municipal Councils will promote gender equality or voice women’s concerns? Or will 
they fear to openly confront the government and their male counterparts who support 
discriminatory polices against women? Perhaps even if elected, Saudi Arabian women 
councilors would be committed to women’s rights and willing to foster policies that 
would enhance gender equality, but their initiatives may simply be ignored by the male 
councilors. Similarly, citizens’ political participation via the Internet might generate 
awareness, but the impact of such participation is also limited. For instance, citizens 
could criticize the authoritarian government on social media, but shaming does not lead 
to democratization, especially when authoritarian regimes are not accountable. Moreover, 
authoritarian states may impose restrictions on the use of the Internet through the 
cybercrime law. Hence, while political participation may thrive within the framework of 
authoritarian systems like the sultanistic regimes, it may not guarantee or contribute to 
democratization because citizens’ political and civil freedoms remain restricted.  
Authoritarian regimes use political repression to inhibit citizens’ political 
participation, undermining civil and political liberties because granting freedoms to 
citizens could lead to political instability and disunity. In sultanistic regimes, social 
contract between the incumbent and the populace is almost nonexistent; when citizens 
demand political freedoms the regime responds with political repression, using a 
mechanism of coercion to halt citizens’ attempts at political participation. For example, 
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perhaps Saudi Arabian women were given just enough space in the 2015 Municipal 
Councils to keep them quiet. This was done in order to prevent women from undermining 
the legitimacy of the regime. Perhaps if the government of Saudi Arabia had not extended 
political suffrage to women in 2015, then it would have incurred higher costs from Saudi 
Arabian women’s unconventional activities. Thus, to curb women’s activism, the 
government appeases women by allowing them to participate openly in order to maintain 
control over their activities. Maintenance of control is only possible through direct 
surveillance by the secret police, which remains a significant tool of authoritarian states. 
Through surveillance, authoritarian regimes may check citizens’ activities, ensuring that 
these activities are not threatening to the internal order.  
What we do not know is how political repression may impact women’s political 
participation in Saudi Arabia. The literature showed that authoritarian regimes often grant 
concessions to some groups in the society because the threat from these groups is 
perceived as minimal. For example, most of the Arab authoritarian regimes often 
perceive women as least threatening, and therefore instigated concessions by granting 
women the right to political participation. Once women acquire space in the political 
realm, they may face obstacles that would prevent them from advancing women’s issues 
and rights, and in addition their activities may be strictly monitored under the direct 
control of the authoritarian government. By appointing women to key positions, the 
government portrays its stance as being pro-women, which facilitates international 
legitimacy.  
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As seen from the Municipal Council Elections in 2015, a lot of pro-women’s 
rights candidates were not admitted to stand for election. Women candidates were 
meticulously checked and selected, and the candidates who were involved in some sort of 
pro-human rights advocacy were dropped from the lists. Thus the government often 
appoints “safe” candidates who are tied to the ruling royal members, and in this way 
women just become a reflection of the government. Is granting political participation to 
women in Saudi Arabia just another means of the state’s repressive control, i.e., 
elimination of potential defectors? Does the Kingdom’s concession to women give a sign 
of hope that the grievances of other social cleavages will be taken care of? Do women 
remain a voiceless minority with no power capacities to influence the decision-making 
process? To determine this, I decided to investigate the opinions and perspectives of 
Saudi Arabian women to get a sense of their freedom in expressing their views, and their 
attitudes about Saudi Arabia’s stance in regards to women’s political participation.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
I sought to investigate whether the recent 2015 elections, a political opening for 
Saudi Arabian women, initiated a positive impact and improved women’s social status in 
the Kingdom. Ideally, information could be gathered from country specific public records 
or through a survey method. However, I was focused more on personal perspectives from 
Saudi Arabian women themselves to get a sense of whether the elections affected their 
sense of a greater freedom.  
The information from public records, if readily available, would be 
comprehensive, incorporating statistics regarding the number of women (names, dates, 
background) holding political positions and standing in elections. Other public 
information would incorporate details on the level of women’s political participation in 
the elections per district or a municipality. Unfortunately, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
does not update or make its records accessible, and those limited records that are 
available are not accessible to the public. Likewise, the survey method, which involves 
administering interviews with Saudi Arabian women to inquire about their views and 
attitudes toward the level of women’s political participation in Saudi Arabia, implies 
limitations.  
The survey method is preferable in many ways because a researcher can gain 
access to information that is not publically available, i.e., the attitudes of women in Saudi 
Arabian society. However, one major drawback is the recruitment of participants who are 
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willing to be open, honest, and unrestricted. Based on the reasons mentioned above, I 
adopted a personal approach – I wanted to interview Saudi Arabian women activists to 
ask them questions about this new political opening. I thought that personal interviews 
were more intimate because they facilitate social trust. If my interviewees felt that they 
could trust me, then they would be more honest and willing to share personal stories and 
experiences that would capture their sense of political participation in Saudi Arabia. This 
personal interview approach is discussed in more detail in the following sections of this 
chapter.  
Option One: Public Records 
The extent to which Saudi Arabian women’s participation in politics has evolved 
over time could be addressed by using public records. The analysis could compare, for 
example, the level of women’s employment such as the number of women holding legal, 
administrative, police, and other government positions. To evaluate women’s security in 
the state, one could look at whether Saudi Arabia is signatory to international treaties that 
protect women’s rights such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Similarly, one could evaluate the 
constitutional law – for instance, whether Saudi Arabia created legal barriers like age, 
marital status, or tribal affiliation that could prevent women from voting or being elected. 
Analysis of recent amendments to the law could provide more information in regards to 
the status of women; for instance, whether women have access to courts. Looking at 
women’s grassroots organizations in the country while also assessing their sources of 
funding could also be useful in acquiring more information. This information was 
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gathered through secondary sources like local and international newspapers, journal 
articles, scholarly publications, and country specific reports published by the international 
agencies (United Nations Women, Women Stats, International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance). Overall, I was able to find few reports on the subject of 
women’s participation across economic, political, and social sectors, but this information 
has not been updated since 2011. Many United Nations (UN) rapporteurs and working 
groups have been monitoring and pressing the Saudi Arabian government to improve its 
human rights practices. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is signatory to CEDAW as of 
2000, and is required to submit regular reports that identify the improvements made by 
the government in relation to its signed treaties (Alhargan 2012, 131). Since Saudi Arabia 
ratified CEDAW, the Kingdom ought to report every year to the international 
commission on its achievements in bringing women’s equality and rights. However, the 
government of Saudi Arabia does not keep updated records, and the last record was 
issued in 2008 (UN Women, CEDAW). Moreover, Saudi Arabia has not signed the 
Optional Protocol of CEDAW, which enables citizens to bypass the national courts and 
seek redress by submitting individual petitions directly to the UN for adjudication. Such 
international legality permits citizens to hold their governments accountable in the case of 
violations (Smith-Cannoy 2012, 17). Upon ratification of CEDAW or any other treaty, 
Saudi Arabia submits a reservation that reads: “In the case of contradiction between any 
term of the Convention and the norms of Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under 
obligation to observe the contradictory terms of the Convention.” Thus, the national 
courts of Saudi Arabia overrule the international obligation. When the Kingdom of Saudi 
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Arabia signs a particular international treaty, it further fails to comply with this ratified 
international norm. In the absence of independent non-governmental organizations and 
international organizations that could oversee implementation, noncompliance becomes a 
relatively low cost for Saudi Arabia (Smith-Cannoy 2012, 25). For instance, human rights 
violations are only reported through Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as a 
strategy for shaming the government for its violations. There exists a long list of UN 
treaties and conventions that Saudi Arabia has not signed. The underlying bases of these 
unsigned treaties involve protection of individual freedoms, and these range from 
women’s rights (CEDAW being the exception), the international bill of human rights, 
protection of minority rights, slavery, protection from torture, protection from 
discrimination, and freedom of association (Ratification of International Human Rights 
Treaties: Saudi Kingdom 2016). In my struggle to find available public records on the 
topic of women’s political participation, this information was beyond my reach. For 
example, when looking at the policies and recommendations submitted by the UN 
international rapporteurs on the treaty of CEDAW for the years that it was available, I 
realized that the government of Saudi Arabia adopted a reoccurring tendency for differing 
recommendations; i.e., they would continuously ignore the recommendations made by 
the UN rapporteurs. Also, when searching for information such as aspects of women’s 
security, land ownership, and property rights, I found that this information also remained 
unreported by the Saudi Arabian government. Meanwhile, in regards to the 2015 
elections, the international journalists only covered women’s political participation on the 
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surface; details including the names, professions, and backgrounds of Saudi Arabian 
women competing in the elections were left unreported.  
Option Two: Survey Method 
An alternative approach to analyze whether an increase in the political 
participation of women created greater political space for women in Saudi Arabia could 
be established by conducting in-depth interviews with Saudi Arabian women who are 
active in promoting and advocating for women’s equality and rights in the Kingdom. 
These women activists, for example, could shed light into the inner workings of the 
Municipal Council Elections, and provide invaluable information in regards to both 
opportunities and impediments faced by women activists. Hence, survey research is one 
of the most effective options for gathering information about the attitudes, behaviors, and 
interests of a particular society. However, the quality of the survey method depends upon 
the cumulative result of many participants, and when the researcher fails to obtain a full 
list of participants the “inferential value” of the method decreases. Nevertheless, the 
quality of the survey method can be improved substantially because it is contingent upon 
two factors, which are contacting and participation. To illustrate, one can increase the 
cooperation of participants through various means, such as sending invitation letters in 
advance, creating follow up reminders, producing interview scripts that are persuasive, 
and lastly, providing incentivizing payments (Groves, Cialdini, and Couper 1992, 476).   
There exists a set of global characteristics that help researchers predict the level of 
cooperation from participants. For instance, the degree of political trust towards a 
political system and its institutions felt by a particular individual may impact the level of 
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cooperation. Similarly, if a society is continuously subjected to surveying, this could 
decrease the level of cooperation due to exhaustion and disinterest (Groves, Cialdini, and 
Couper 1992, 477). The experience of the researcher may further inhibit the level of 
cooperation; skilled and confident interviewers are more likely to achieve high levels of 
participation. Moreover, the psychological factors of participants play an important role 
since they may determine whether the participants will be willing to cooperate. Social 
validation also encourages participation; for example, when respondents believe that 
others would comply with the research, they are more likely to comply with it 
themselves. Finally, compliance increases in the presence of an authoritative figure; 
people are more responsive to requests when they are approached by a higher authority, 
for instance, a professor rather than a student (Groves, Cialdini, and Couper 1992, 482). 
Most of the respondents prior to participation engage in cost and benefit analysis; this 
means evaluating whether participation would outweigh the individual costs. Some of the 
individual costs are the time required to answer the questions, the lost opportunity to 
perform other activities, and the cognitive burden of understanding the questions. On the 
other hand, benefits could entail being introduced to novel topics, enjoyment from 
participation, and a sense of altruism or individual contribution to social good (Groves 
and Couper 1998, 122).   
Nonetheless, survey cooperation is decreasing due to an increase in the rate of 
refusals. This is of a great concern for researchers who aim to evaluate social attitudes in 
regards to a particular political, social, or economic context. Survey cooperation requires 
social trust, and the survey method implies interaction with strangers; i.e., an interviewer 
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who has no pre-existing personal ties with the participant, a condition required for quality 
research to eliminate selection bias. However, individuals are then reluctant to speak 
openly about certain issues simply because they do not trust the interviewer (Dillman 
2000, 19-21).  
Research shows that “social trust” among citizens tends to be generally lower in 
countries that have experienced non-democratic governments for a long time (Stolle 
2009, 13). Citizens who live in authoritarian regimes often do not trust their governments 
due to factors like embedded corruption, government incompetence, and lack of 
institutional accountability. In addition, authoritarian regimes often establish totalitarian 
control over the population, limiting citizens’ political and social participation. When 
citizens decide to reveal information related to political culture in the country, they may 
face punishment. Hence, citizens living in such societies generally lack social trust 
towards the political system, and when approached for questioning they often prefer not 
to be involved in research that probes political issues. Individuals in repressive societies 
may feel comfortable discussing politics with family, friends or relatives – people with 
whom they share “intimacy, trust, respect, access and mutual regard” – because such 
emotional connection provides a safety net (Torcal and Maldonado 2014, 5).  However, 
citizens themselves may refuse to cooperate with research that presents political 
questions, simply because they conform to government’s political culture. Citizens 
subscribe to political norms, social traditions, and religions that reinforce certain 
political-economic contexts in the country. For instance, many Saudi Arabian nationals 
support and adhere to the Wahhabi ideology that prescribes gender roles and gender 
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relations; they view such political culture as a part of their own identity, i.e., what makes 
them feel they are Saudi Arabian nationals. Hence, aspects of political repression and 
political culture were evident in my study. Initially, when I sought to interview Saudi 
Arabian women, a majority of them expressed an interest but later refused to engage or 
participate in the research. The general trend was that Saudi Arabian women were 
unwilling to cooperate in research that posed political questions either because they were 
afraid or because they were not interested.  
Option Three: Personal Interviews 
With these challenges in mind, how could I examine the level of Saudi Arabian 
women’s political participation? Evaluating Saudi Arabian women’s access to public 
office – whether they were able to influence the decision-making process and advocate 
for women’s equality in the Kingdom – was my primary interest. My goal was to discuss 
with each woman questions related to segregation, personal life histories, and their 
opinions regarding women’s political participation – whether they saw it as a first step 
towards a greater role for Saudi Arabian women in politics. I wanted to ask them a long-
list of questions, and I designed about twenty-five questions. These questions were: How 
was it like growing up as a little girl in Saudi Arabia? Did you face gender 
discrimination? When you were young what were your aspirations - who did you want to 
become? In your day-to-day life, was “gender segregation” ever an issue? If you had a 
choice would you prefer coeducation? Explain your preference. In the past have you ever 
experience that simply being a woman was an obstacle in attaining a goal? Education is 
important for women’s empowerment, yet educated Saudi Arabian women are unable to 
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secure jobs despite their skills and qualifications, in your opinion why would that be? 
What does women’s rights mean to you as a Saudi Arabian woman? Do you feel you 
have power as a woman in your society e.g. physical, security, access to law, political 
power? Do you feel that gender segregation is repressive or is it necessary? Do you feel 
that not being able to drive is an impediment and would you consider it as a woman’s 
right? Would your family accept you working in a mixed environment i.e. with male 
colleagues side by side? Do you think religious-cultural rhetoric reinforces patriarchy in 
your country? Is it an impediment for women’s rights? Do you think that local non-
governmental organizations bring about social change that is beneficial to women? Do 
you feel that the Arab Spring events in the Middle East had an impact upon Saudi 
Arabian women? Today, do you believe women in your society are more empowered in 
politics, economics, and social aspects than they were ten years ago? In your opinion 
what have fostered that change? Do you think women should be a part of political 
process in order to have the ability to voice issues and concerns related to women? How 
important is it for you to have women in the Municipal Councils? Do you think that a 
woman at the Municipal Council is able to promote a policy that may improve women’s 
rights in the country? How? Did you vote at the 2015 national elections? Why not? When 
casting your vote did you favor women over men candidates? Explain your preference. 
What do you think prevents women from voting for female candidates? The media states 
that female candidates are unable to secure votes or are bad campaigners, what is your 
opinion on that? Would you agree with this statement, “allowing women to run for office 
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would actually foster women’s equality at the national level.” What are your expectations 
for women’s rights in the future?  
Even though I really wished to ask all of these questions, I knew in practicality it 
might be difficult as these questions are sensitive and Saudi Arabian women may not feel 
comfortable answering them. For instance, some Saudi Arabian women political activists 
may not view gender segregation as an impediment to women’s social status or rights. 
Saudi Arabian women may be supportive of the gender segregation policy because it 
could preserve a woman’s honor and earn her respect – a characteristic that is highly 
valued in Saudi Arabian society. Mixing with unrelated men could damage a woman’s 
reputation and could lead to social stigmatization. Therefore, later I revised my questions 
in order to neutralize the sensitivity of my study. 
 The first two options listed above were not feasible for my research inquiry. The 
first option, gathering information through public records, was not viable because the 
government curbs civil society organizations that could report about the political, 
economic and social state of affairs in the Kingdom. The Kingdom controls local 
organizations, press, and media to allow only the publication of information that the 
government sees as favorable. Meanwhile, the Saudi Arabian government itself refrains 
from publishing records related to political issues, as the government wants to prevent 
public access to this information in order to maintain internal stability and legitimacy. 
The second option, conducting interviews with Saudi Arabian women, would be the most 
effective strategy because I could learn more about women’s political participation in the 
Kingdom. However, most of the Saudi Arabian women political activists I contacted 
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refused to participate in my research study. I sensed that the government of Saudi Arabia 
frowns upon citizens’ involvement in research that underlines sensitive political issues.  
Perhaps some women I was in contact with wanted to share their views, 
experiences, and knowledge, but after evaluating the likely negative impacts, they refused 
to participate for security reasons, i.e., avoiding the risks associated with political 
repercussion. Initially, the responses I received from women depicted interest in 
participation – women expressed will and eagerness to answer the interview questions. I 
truly believed that the Saudi Arabian government made a first step for greater reform by 
granting Saudi Arabian women suffrage; I thought that this would eventually further 
empower women in the Kingdom. Following King’s Fahd efforts, and King Abdullah’s 
decree and public reporting on 2015 elections, there seemed to be a real opening for 
Saudi Arabian women’s political participation; everyone seemed excited and was 
celebrating around the world in solidarity with Saudi Arabian women. I was eager to 
explore what political participation meant for Saudi Arabian women, and whether it had 
an impact upon women’s lives. I thought that women would be proud to share their first 
experiences both as political voters and as candidates.  
Perhaps my approach towards Saudi Arabian women was influenced by Western 
ideas. I was convinced that Saudi Arabian women would be open to my research inquiry 
even though my personal experience stated otherwise. I mistakenly perceived that Saudi 
Arabian women were now free to express their attitudes and views, since they had 
acquired greater political opening. In the past, Saudi Arabian women were vocal, openly 
challenging the clerics and the state, demanding rights and equality for women in the 
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Kingdom. Numerous Saudi Arabian women activists had participated in Internet 
blogging and televised debates, raising concerns about the discrimination and 
marginalization of women in society. Over thousands of Saudi Arabian women have 
signed petitions to the King in an attempt to demand political change. If in the past Saudi 
Arabian women were not limited in their struggle towards women’s equality and rights, I 
thought they would be willing to share their opinions now, because their overall efforts 
brought a feasible change, i.e., the right to vote and to stand in elections. However, in the 
course of my research investigation, political repression became an underlining factor 
that inhibited Saudi Arabian women’s political participation and prevented them from 
participating in my research inquiry. Furthermore, I realized that the meaning of political 
participation is different for Saudi Arabian women than what Western theories have 
portrayed – for women under authoritarian repressive states, political participation entails 
a much slower process, in which political opening does not guarantee civil or political 
rights to citizens.  
The research process I was involved in pushed me in a different direction, i.e., to 
investigate a relationship between political repression and women’s political 
participation. I also discovered the underlying influence of political culture upon 
women’s political participation. Political culture is a mechanism of political repression 
that inhibits women’s aspirations for political participation in Saudi Arabian society. In 
order to make the case for the relationship, part of my analysis strategy would examine 
difficulties I encountered in my attempts to get information from women about politics. 
In the course of my research investigation, I witnessed political repression implemented 
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by the state through a dictation of political culture; this prevented Saudi Arabian women 
from political participation and from free speech. When subjected to continuous 
surveillance and coercion, citizens no longer trust their government even when the 
government creates limited political concessions, and for this reason they refrain from 
expressing their views and opinions. Similarly, when citizens are exposed to a particular 
political culture that advocates for authoritarianism and citizens’ submission, then 
citizens no longer aspire for political power or participation. Even though in my research 
study I managed to gather only four interviews from Saudi Arabian women outlining 
their attitudes and opinions, I am certain that this was due to political repression that 
reinforces a specific political culture; I would have acquired greater cooperation in 
participation if Saudi Arabian women were actually free to express their political 
thoughts.  
Research Intention 
In order to conceptualize whether the women of Saudi Arabia have more political, 
economic, and social power, and to understand the status of women’s empowerment in 
Saudi Arabia, I first intended to talk to thirty Saudi Arabian women activists by 
conducting semi-structured interviews to ask them about their opinions in regards to 
recent political opening and whether such opening enhanced women’s rights and equality 
in the Kingdom. Hence, my research study was to be exploratory as it relied upon 
opinions and attitudes of Saudi Arabian women. I wanted to interview activists who 
advocate for women’s equality and rights in the Kingdom, intending to recruit Saudi 
Arabian women residing in the United States of America and in the Kingdom of Saudi 
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Arabia to participate. I planned to administer the interviews with Saudi Arabian women 
via the Apple application FaceTime, with each interview lasting 20 to 60 minutes at most. 
The pool of potential participants had to be educated Saudi Arabian women nationals, 
Muslims who were ethnically Arab. I hoped that interviewing Saudi Arabian women 
would expose their opinions, attitudes, dreams, and achievements in relation to their 
social position and quality of life, while their descriptions of personal experiences in the 
fields of education, work, and family would unveil their position in regards to women’s 
rights in the Kingdom. I also intended to interview more senior Saudi Arabian women 
who were experienced and knowledgeable about the subject matter since they might be 
well informed about developments and changes that were taking place in the Kingdom 
across social, political, and economic aspects.  
I revised my questions for the study and designed new ones limiting the number 
of questions and neutralizing the sensitivity of the topic. There were four questions in 
total, two inquiring about the educational background of the participant and her parents, 
followed by a hypothetical scenario to probe the participants’ attitudes towards women’s 
rights, and a fourth question designed to evaluate the participants’ levels of support for 
women’s advancement. These were the questions: What is your highest level of 
education, what degree? Where did you get that degree - in Saudi Arabia or Abroad? 
Which university? When did you get your degree? Why did you decide to study in Saudi 
Arabia or Abroad? And what about your Father: same questions as above. And what 
about your Mother: same question as above. I would like to know about how your family 
supports your political participation. Can you give an example of how your husband 
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supports your participation? Can you give an example of how your mother or father 
supports your participation? I would like you to imagine this scenario: A number of 
women decide to drive in your city to protest the driving ban. How likely are you to join 
them and drive a car? What factors would influence your decision (as above)? My 
husband would approve (disapprove)? My mother and father would approve 
(disapprove)? My other supporters would approve (disapprove)? Which of these three: 
husband, parents, others would be most important in your decision? It is sometimes 
suggested that women need the real support of men to get ahead in society. If they do not 
have it, their activities and political participation will be limited. Do you feel you have 
support for your political participation, that you feel safe and secure if you speak out in 
public or violate a norm of behavior on women? Where does your support come from? 
Do you have special connections that allow you to speak out?  
Generally, when research involves a stigmatized group, it is unlikely that they will 
be willing to give answers to questions that they deem sensitive. To overcome such 
limitations I followed the method of a “chain referral” that was previously implemented 
by other scholars who were also inquiring about Saudi Arabian women. For instance, 
Mona AlMunajjed (1997, 22), a Saudi Arabian sociologist who had lived in the Kingdom 
for many years, experienced difficulties in finding other Saudi Arabian women to talk to. 
She initiated contacts by referring to her personal networks first, to acquire participants to 
ask questions. It was a general trend among Saudi Arabian women to be cautious in 
sharing or giving out information to researchers. Similarly, the French sociologist Amélie 
Le Renard (2014, 104) experienced similar difficulties. As a foreign woman, she was 
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mistrusted and it took her a few weeks to establish good relationships with the Saudi 
Arabian women she interviewed. For instance, she encountered numerous obstacles, 
especially when she intended to visit a university campus in Saudi Arabia for potential 
respondents. When girls themselves wanted to be interviewed, university officials denied 
access to the researcher. Following the steps of previous researchers on the question of 
Saudi Arabian women, I too decided to adopt a chain referral method because the 
sensitivity of the research inquiry implied a limited subgroup of the population that could 
be located only through the means of chain referral.  
Getting a Sample 
In my approach to recruiting participants I implemented chain referral sampling, a 
method widely used in qualitative sociological research especially when a research topic 
deals with sensitive issues. The method provides a sample through referrals made among 
people who share similar characteristics; i.e., an insider locates other possible participants 
who are of interest for the research. The chain referral method entails a prolonged process 
in which a “researcher must actively and deliberately control the initiation, progress and 
termination” (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981, 143). The general complications encountered 
in the use of the chain referral method include starting the referral chains, verifying the 
eligibility of each participant, engaging respondents in recruitment of other potential 
participants, controlling for quality and the number of chains. The reason why I have 
implemented this method was to recruit Saudi Arabian women who were politically 
active in promoting women’s rights in the Kingdom. Since I conducted my research in 
the Unites States and not in Saudi Arabia, I was limited in my access to Saudi Arabian 
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women, and to find Saudi Arabian women to interview I had to ask individuals among 
my acquaintances for their contacts.  
I initiated referral chains by asking students and faculty at the University of 
Denver, where I am a student, for possible contacts. I started with faculty whose fields of 
research and interest were in line with the Middle East. I contacted faculty members from 
the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, and some of them provided contacts 
who referred me to Saudi Arabian citizens. When I acquired a recommended referral, I 
directly contacted the person by sending them an introductory research brief via email 
communication. The brief stated:  
I am delighted to be in contact with you. I am a second year student at the University 
of Denver working towards MA in International Studies. I am pursuing research 
question that explores women's political participation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Research indicates that Saudi Arabian women becoming more active in promoting 
equality, security in the Kingdom and that woman are actively redefining and 
overcoming traditional boundaries. I am interested in learning what are these channels. 
I would like to know whether recent positive changes in regards to women's 
participation at the Municipal Council elections enhanced women's equality. To 
inquire answers for this question, I would like to administer a short interview with 
you. The interview would take about 20 to 30 minutes of your time and would be 
conducted through Skype or FaceTime, whichever you prefer. During the interview I 
will ask four general questions related to women's participation in the Kingdom. I am 
enthusiastic about this research because I believe Saudi Arabia with enactment of 
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recent changes made a bold step towards women’s future. I appreciate your interest 
and your time. And I am happy to provide you more information as my thesis 
proceeds. 
I then waited for each participant to respond, giving her about three days to one week. If 
they did not answer, I sent in the same message with a personal resume attached as a 
reminder, ensuring that it was not lost in the junk folder. In the absence of a response 
within the next two days, I sent a courtesy message that read:  
I have got your contact through... s/he said you were interested and willing to 
participate in the interview, for which I am very thankful. I hope you are doing well. 
Perhaps you are busy with your schedule. I just want to send you a check-in email and 
provide you with latest information in regards to my thesis on “Saudi Arabian 
women’s political participation.” Attached are interview questions and a consent form 
for your reference. Kindly, let me know if you are still interested in participation and if 
you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them. Thank you for your time 
and consideration, I really hope you can participate in my research study. 
Then I waited for at least two to three days, and upon not receiving a reply, I followed up 
for the last time with an email message that read: 
I hope you are well. I do apologies for my emails but please, let me know if you are 
still interested in this interview. It would not take more than 20 minutes of your time. I 
would really appreciate your feedback. I am attaching the interview questions and my 
resume for your kind reference. Respectfully awaiting a response. 
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In the course of these follow-up email messages that were not answered, I subsequently 
engaged in finding new participants for the study by asking faculty and students at the 
university for referrals. 
Professor A, an expert on Middle Eastern issues pointed out some valuable 
contacts for my research. I was referred to two women from Canada and London. The 
woman from London is a Saudi Arabian professor at the University of London who 
published a book in 2013 (A Most Masculine State) that addresses the woman question. I 
contacted her multiple times but never received a reply. On the contrary, the woman from 
Canada, a journalist experienced in Middle Eastern politics, immediately responded to 
my query. In her email message she said:  
Your project sounds interesting. I'm putting you in touch with our amazing friend, a 
Saudi celebrity (and a dynamic smart activist and public figure). You're lucky! Even 
though she's busy with her jet-setting lifestyle and full schedule she really knows some 
interesting Saudi women that she could put you in touch with and also some Saudi 
women in the States. 
 I followed up with this woman and she replied: “I am always just on the run and 
travelling perhaps, if you can send me an email on what is that you require I will see what 
I can do to help or introduce you to people who can help you.” I sent her an introductory 
brief of my research; she liked it very much and forwarded it to six Saudi Arabian women 
contacts involved in politics, economics and women’s advocacy in the Kingdom. In her 
email she mentioned: “Ladies, a friend needs to interview various women on the effect of 
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the municipalities for her MA thesis… would appreciate it if you can do it for her... and if 
you can also forward to others. I think she needs about 30 in total, please help her.”  
Although she was very helpful in directing me to possible participants, she refused to 
participate in the research directly. When I approached her with the possibility, she 
explained that time was a constraint because she tends to travel a lot and has a very busy 
schedule. She also said that she would not be responsible if women whom she allegedly 
introduced me to do not respond. She said: “I can see what I can do but I am sure you 
understand also that my time is limited… so I really cannot follow up at all with who 
replied or did not. I am sure you are going to be also trying to find other Saudi women 
through other channels.” I waited a week and then sent in an introductory brief in another 
email message once more, in order to follow up with the six Saudi Arabian women on her 
contact list. On January 23, 2016 I received just one response from a woman who is 
active in promoting women’s participation in economics. I will mention my experience 
with her later.  
Professor B, whose field is related to the Middle East, introduced me to a male 
Saudi Arabian doctoral student at the University of Denver whose dissertation was 
similar to my research interests. I followed up with him and we scheduled an informal 
coffee break meeting on January 17, 2016. He was surprised by my desire to research 
Saudi Arabian women’s political participation. He said: “You are the first student I meet 
who is interested to write about Saudi Arabia but especially about Saudi women.” He 
said that the ruling family of Saudi Arabia condemns political activism. The government 
is not interested in granting civil liberties to its citizens, because when citizens are under 
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totalitarian control then the government feels safe, as there are no political challengers. 
He also mentioned that after the Arab Spring uprising in 2011, the government of Saudi 
Arabia increased its surveillance over the population especially in the Eastern Provinces, 
fearing uprising from the disenfranchised Shi’a population. Interestingly, he clarified that 
Saudi Arabia wants to be seen as a reformist government in the eyes of the West, 
however, the changes that the government is initiating are just a façade to cover the 
internal oppression Saudi Arabians face everyday. Furthermore, when the international 
media reports about Saudi Arabia in a negative light, the government immediately 
provides limited concessions to the public. For instance, members of the royalty 
continuously engage in some “democratic” activities – advocating for women’s rights, 
creating awareness for breast cancer or domestic violence, and establishing charitable 
foundations through the country in order to show the world that everyone is taken care of, 
and that the ruled are satisfied. However, in reality this is just a cover story for the West. 
“Only Saudi Arabians know the real internal struggles and challenges they face daily,” he 
said. He was also willing to introduce me to some women from his personal contacts in 
Saudi Arabia. He also said that he knows Saudi Arabian activists who would be open to a 
discussion on my research topic, if it remains confidential. He shared an email of four of 
his contacts; one of them was a famous Saudi Arabian activist who participated in the 
2011 protests demanding political reforms. He also said that he would reach out to more 
contacts on my behalf. Unfortunately, the women I contacted via email did not respond. 
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Discovering Repression 
Through my new acquaintance I was introduced to only one Saudi Arabian 
woman via Facebook on January 25, 2016 – a student at a U.S. University who was 
willing to talk to me. She was also willing to introduce my research to her own contacts. 
She said: “I find your research interesting and I will be pleased to participate in your 
research and answer your questions. I also have a lot of Saudi female friends all around 
the states. Do you want me to ask them for you? How many more Saudi women do you 
need?” I was glad to hear this and told her I needed as many as she could find. Through 
her I was referred to another Saudi Arabian woman via Facebook on the same day; my 
initial Facebook contact said, “I talked to one of my friend about your research and she’s 
willing to answer your questions. This is her Facebook account. You can add her.” Then 
on January 28, 2016 she reached out and said that there were about fifteen Saudi Arabian 
friends that she spoke to on my behalf who refused to disclose information or participate 
in my research directly. They preferred filling out an anonymous questionnaire instead of 
face-to-face Internet communication. She said: “Good news, I asked my friends who are 
also willing to participate in your research but they don’t want to share their contacts. Do 
you mind if I send them your questions and then send you back their answers?”  
I was hesitant to allow them to do so since a questionnaire implies limitations. For 
instance, through face-to face communication I could ask participants to be more 
elaborative in their responses, and I could also explain certain questions with the help of 
examples if participants failed to understand a question. Also, face-to-face interviews 
presume that respondents are more likely to exert cognitive thinking when answering the 
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questions; for example, recollecting personal experiences in their memory that would 
justify their answers. Moreover, face-to-face communication establishes some level of 
trust; the interviewer could engage respondents more by sharing enthusiasm in the topic, 
thus facilitating commitment (Holbrook, Green, and Krosnick 2003, 82-83). I could not 
rely on the information completed by the respondents through a questionnaire simply 
because it would have been done without my oversight. The questionnaires would have to 
be distributed on my behalf by the student to her friends, so I would not be able to 
guarantee whether it would actually be done or not. I also would not have been able to 
verify the eligibility of respondents such as their age and whether they were familiar with 
the 2015 elections and women’s rights. I would not be able to tell whether these Saudi 
Arabian friends were actually women. In addition, when a person unfamiliar with the 
process conducts research, even if it means just distributing the questionnaire, it may lead 
to research biases. The researcher needs to ensure that questions are answered properly, 
while the eligibility of each participant is verified. For example, some respondents 
themselves commit unethical behavior, such as providing dishonest answers (Kountur 
2011, 57). When conducting interviews researchers can ask additional questions to 
distinguish truthful answers, such as asking the respondent to relate to a question with an 
example. Hence, if the Saudi Arabian woman I was in contact with distributed the 
questions on my behalf, from a research point of view it would be deemed unethical 
because the person was not involved in the design of the study. Hence, due to the reasons 
mentioned above, and to eliminate unnecessary selection biases, I decided to stay with 
my initial method – face to face interviews via the Internet.  
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Professor C on February 2, 2016 introduced me to his former Saudi Arabian 
student who is currently a professor at one of the Universities in Saudi Arabia. In his 
message he wrote:  
I have an interesting Uzbek student in class who is writing a thesis about gender 
empowerment in the KSA. She is looking for Saudi women who are involved in – or 
at least are knowledgeable of – the movement to ask questions about how they are 
going about this, what successes they have had, and what social cultural issues are 
involved. I realize that this is particularly sensitive area, but she insists that she can 
maintain confidentiality. She has explained and shown to me the various procedures 
she has instated to assure that confidentiality. Do you happen to know anyone willing 
to help? Do not do this if it puts you in political or cultural problems. 
Consequently, I was introduced to five female students at that university. I 
however received responses from only two Master’s candidates who were eager to be 
interviewed. Both students responded on February 7, 2016. One said:  
Sorry for my late reply because I’m travelling in this month. I’m personally greatly 
interested in your research, and I’ll be so glad to receive more information from you at 
anytime. And if it’s ok with you, when you finish writing your questions can you send 
it to me so I can prepare myself for the interview! 
Another student responded: “Sorry for the delay. I was busy with the mid term exams and 
papers and did not check my email. I am glad to help you on your thesis. Please feel free 
to send me your questions.”  
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They requested me to send them a sample of my interview questions and so I did. 
By then I had my newly designed questions. However, I never had the chance to 
interview these two Saudi Arabian students as one of them stopped answering my emails, 
and the other sent me a short response explaining why she could not participate in the 
research. I have included her explanation later in the following sections.  
Desperate to find participants, on February 15, 2016 I contacted Professor D, who 
works at the English Language Center at my university, as I expected that many Saudi 
Arabian students were enrolled in classes to learn English. The professor was able to 
touch base with previous students, introducing the research proposal on my behalf. One 
of the students expressed interest in participation, so I was introduced to her. My 
professor said, “I would like to introduce you to... The student I mentioned is willing to 
participate, so I will now step out and let both of you coordinate with each other! Good 
luck with your project.”  But this student never responded. I though maybe this student 
felt pressured to say that she was interested in the research and had simply lied to her 
professor. I will never know the true reasons. I then contacted three Saudi Arabian 
students from my previous English Language Competence class via Canvas, but my 
efforts failed as these students too did not respond to my email messages.  
On February 21, 2016 I further followed up with the Saudi Student Association 
Group at the University of Denver. There are about thirty-five students in this group. I 
met with two Saudi Arabian men, the president and the vice president of the association, 
and asked them if they knew any Saudi Arabian female students and if they were part of 
the student organization. One mentioned that there were five female Saudi Arabian 
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students in the group, and that he would pass my contact information on to them. I never 
heard back from them. I then reached out to seven Saudi Arabian women acquaintances 
in the UAE, most of whom I knew personally as they were my classmates at the 
American University of Sharjah. Some of these women remained in the UAE while the 
majority traveled back to Saudi Arabia. Generally, the result was predictable: most of the 
women ignored my request, and one women said she would rather not engage in the 
interview as she had “no time,” but said she would ask around to find others who might 
be willing. I realized that no one was really willing to participate.  
Similarly, on February 26, 2016, I contacted officers working at the International 
House for International Student & Scholar Services (ISSS); they were supposed to 
forward my introductory email to all Saudi Arabian students at the University of Denver. 
Although I do not know the exact number of Saudi Arabian students enrolled in the 
university for the year 2016, I do know that among the international students, enrollment 
by Saudi Arabians is second highest after Chinese students. However, I was not contacted 
by any of the Saudi Arabian students at the university. 
Moreover, I attended two conferences in the winter of 2016 in order to contact 
more participants to inquire about Saudi Arabian women activists. The two conferences 
were on “Extremism and Islamophobia in Perspective: Understanding ISIS Appeal” and 
“Gender, Peace and Security: What’s Next?” both held at the University of Denver. I had 
a chance to speak with the keynote speaker, a lawyer with expertise in international 
human rights and gender issues. I introduced myself and briefly explained the purpose of 
my research; she expressed overwhelming interest and was willing to share my proposal 
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with some of her professional contacts. I sent her an introductory brief, and on February 
13, 2016 she responded: “Deep apologies for the delay in getting back to you. I’ve been 
contacted with some people who I think will be able to help you. I will send them this 
information, and if they are agreeable I will connect them with you.” Within the next two 
days she replied: “I would like to introduce you to... she has a long and distinguished 
career working on national security. She also spent four years in Saudi Arabia. She 
continues to work closely with women there and I think will be a great resource to you.”  
She introduced me to an American woman from Washington DC who is known 
for organizing Saudi Arabian women’s conferences and is affiliated with diplomats. I 
followed up with the woman from DC and on February 16, 2016 she replied:  
I am delighted to read of this research. I have many names to give. As you know the 
two women who won in Jeddah are facing a struggle over being allowed into the 
council room. There are few prominent Saudi women that come back and forth to the 
states... but Skype or what’s app will also work for interviews. If there was a chance 
[you] could come to DC, I hold quarterly networking sessions for Saudi women 
students (there are over 2,000 women students)… and [you] might want to come to 
one of these and have face to face conversations... The Saudis do not allow civil 
society or NGO’s... so it is interesting how the women have reached out to each other.  
I was happy to hear this proposition and looked forward to flying to DC. Initially, this 
woman seemed interested in my topic and she even gave me information about Saudi 
Arabian women who have participated in Municipal Council Elections stating that some 
of her acquaintances would be willing to speak to me. To my surprise, she never replied 
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after this. I sent her an email message on February 18, 2016 that was left unanswered. 
Finally, on March 1, 2016 my thesis advisor emailed her on my behalf: 
Amal would like to interview Saudi women to get a sense of how women in politics is 
working in their country, and from my understanding---see messages below--you 
would be a great contact for her through your networking groups. She is quite willing 
to come to D.C. to talk to the women, and has organized a few questions to ask them. 
Do you have any immediate plans for another networking meeting?  Would you like 
any assurances from me about Amal's project? She has already prepared a research 
proposal and set of specific question for an interview that might last from 15-30 
minutes max, and is well-aware of sensitivities around the issues. 
 This time she responded: 
Hello to you all. Sorry for the delay in responding... Because of all this travel, I have 
not planned the next Saudi networking event yet. It will probably be in April. 
However, I could do some [electronic] introductions for Amal and some of these 
women. You are correct that many might be concerned about speaking publicly on 
political issues. Would their identities be respected?   
On March 3, 2016 she introduced me to about six Saudi Arabian women contacts:  
Hello to you all! I wanted you to meet Amal Azimova... She is working on her 
Master’s thesis on the development of the new political participation of women in the 
Kingdom. Amal could Skype you or FaceTime or WhatsApp. Also, if you know of 
others who might want to be interviewed, please let me know. 
These women never responded after I emailed them one more time on March 10, 2016. 
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Lastly, my thesis advisor on March 3, 2016 contacted a Professor E in Colorado Springs 
and introduced my research topic on my behalf. I was referred to a doctoral student from 
Saudi Arabia who I was able to interview and who provided me with insightful 
information, which will be explained in the later section. 
I personally reached out to over forty contacts both in the United States and in 
Saudi Arabia, to women from various walks of life: activists in Saudi Arabian politics, 
celebrities, and students. Additionally, I know that my initial chain of contacts have 
reached out on my behalf to over eighty potential Saudi Arabian women. I contacted all 
my professors both at the University of Denver and the American University of Sharjah 
asking them for referrals of Saudi Arabian women contacts. I reached out to my 
acquaintances in the UAE and in the US, but these attempts did not guide me to more 
Saudi Arabian contacts, therefore I have not included them. In the course of my 
encounters with Saudi Arabian women, many have promised to introduce my research 
inquiry to more contacts, but this too never worked out. In general, my own numerous 
attempts to get a response from Saudi Arabian women were left unanswered, ignored, 
and forgotten. In some instances, I did receive a brief note explaining unwillingness to 
participate in the study. I thought, “Why would these women refuse to participate? Am I 
the only one enthusiastic about the future of women’s political participation in the 
Kingdom? Or is it that the recent political space granted to women was a mere façade that 
has not produced a positive reform that could alter attitudes?” Then I wondered whether 
my questions were culturally inappropriate. But how could four innocent questions that 
probed the level of a participant’s education and their overall attitude towards women’s 
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political participation be considered culturally sensitive? Hence, finding Saudi Arabian 
nationals who could freely speak about gender dynamics of exclusion or inclusion 
operating among citizens, or the status of civil–political activisms in the Kingdom 
seemed an impossible task. Many individuals whom I have reached out to were at first 
eager about the possibility of sharing their experiences, but later they refused to do so. 
Nonetheless, I remained resolute to my task, and I was able to schedule informal brief 
interviews with four Saudi Arabian women.  
 Since January 2016, I reached out with my research proposal to Saudi Arabian 
women residing in the Kingdom and in the United States. Despite frequent attempts, by 
April I had secured informal conversations via FaceTime with just four Saudi Arabian 
women. I concluded that Saudi Arabian women were reluctant to share their experiences 
or even reflect upon their attitudes towards women’s political participation. Saudi 
Arabian government and society cannot readily accept a researcher probing for 
information, as inquiring about the political situation or people’s lives is generally 
frowned upon. The situation could be one of mistrust towards the foreign researcher, as 
well as towards the government that could retaliate with unprecedented consequences. 
The government censures Saudi Arabians from speaking openly about issues. One Saudi 
Arabian student I was in touch with, who cautiously agreed to be interviewed, later said:  
Unfortunately, I can't proceed with the interview. I got a warning from my supervisor 
this week that I'm not allowed to talk about the country's politics or any controversial 
issues related to Saudi Arabia, otherwise it will cost me my full scholarship. I'm not 
sure whether it is a coincidence or my computer and emails are monitored. Therefore, 
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for security reasons, I'm not going to be able to help. I really wanted to help, as your 
topic is relevant to my interests. Sorry again. 
I was aware of the sensitivity of my topic inquiry; hence it was no longer 
surprising that I only had four informal conversations. Saudi Arabian women avoid 
openly confronting the state that perpetuates women’s exclusion and marginalization. It 
has become common for women to remain passive, especially when there is a lack of 
consensus on the part of society in regards to gender equality. Does the government of 
Saudi Arabia perceive drastic changes in gender relations as a threat to social and 
political legitimacy – legitimacy that is based upon power duality between Saudi Arabian 
princes and Wahhabi clerics? Perhaps there exist only two windows of opportunity by 
which Saudi Arabian women could openly question and voice their concerns in regards to 
gender inequality, i.e., through fictional literature and Internet blogging. Most Saudi 
Arabian women novelists express their strong opinions in regards to politics, social 
relations, and religion under a pen name (Al-Rasheed 2013). Such camouflage provides 
Saudi Arabian women with a shield from harassment, public prosecution, stigmatization, 
and punishment. If Saudi Arabian women were to openly challenge both religious and 
political authority, they may be subjected to legal consequences.  
I never expected that the process would involve so many challenges; the main 
challenge of course was finding participants that were willing to openly discuss sensitive 
topics. I have truly followed the steps required to ensure greater cooperation from Saudi 
Arabian participants. I have made multiple attempts to reach out to Saudi Arabian women 
with a persuasive introductory brief in advance. I followed up with each woman 
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explaining my research study in great detail. Hence, my case witnessed a lack of 
cooperation rather than lack of contact, and the reason for the former was political 
distrust that pushed Saudi Arabian women to remain passive in regards to my requests. 
Even though the culture of Saudi Arabian society maybe highly altruistic, i.e. social trust 
is embedded among individuals since childhood, long-term exposure to authoritarianism 
and the system of surveillance has inhibited the social trust between Saudi Arabians. 
Generally, Saudi Arabians are mistrustful towards each other unless they share closer 
interpersonal connections; for example, Saudi Arabians do not intervene in the internal 
workings of the state or discuss political issues openly with each other because citizens 
are under 24 hour surveillance by the secret police forces. Thus, in order to maintain 
individual harmony, Saudi Arabians keep themselves outside of the political realm.  
Hence, as a researcher my intention was to interview Saudi Arabian women 
activists in order to capture their attitudes, interests and behavior in regards to women’s 
political participation in the Kingdom. However, I realized that in reality, probing Saudi 
Arabian women for such information would be almost inaccessible, since women are 
reluctant to speak due to fear of repercussion from the government. The government does 
not respect civil liberties and censures its citizens from disclosing information related to 
political issues. Women who expose their views liberally in regards to issues such as 
women driving or women working in unsegregated environments face political repression 
from the government. Although participants were assured of non-disclosure of personal 
information that could breach their confidentiality, fear of repercussion was potentially 
the main impediment in participation. If women’s names are exposed, they may face 
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legal punishment in the form of arbitrary imprisonment. Others may escape legal 
punishment but may be subject to social stigmatization, because in Saudi Arabian society 
personal reputation is a matter of the family.  
Being from a former Soviet Socialist republic, I could relate from my personal 
experience. The government of Uzbekistan impedes political and civil liberties, and 
citizens are alienated from political participation. Uzbeks often do not like to discuss the 
political situation or express their opinions because they are afraid of the consequences. 
Due to continuous surveillance of the public, citizens are only free to express their 
opinions with people whom they truly trust. Expressing political opinions with unfamiliar 
individuals may lead to political consequences. Therefore, my analysis for the research 
discussed offers details regarding the research process itself, underlining difficulties 
encountered in retrieving information and in the recruitment of participants for the 
research study. I will also incorporate four distinctive interviews with Saudi Arabian 
women.  
I contacted about forty Saudi Arabian women, but was only able to get responses 
from four women while the other thirty-six women did not respond. Although a lot of 
women expressed interest in my research study, they later refused to participate. I can 
conclude that Saudi Arabian women despite political space have not achieved political or 
civil liberty. Women are not able to express their opinions or attitudes freely because the 
government disallows freedom of expression and considers negative opinions as 
threatening to internal stability. During the electoral process, the government instituted a 
lot of legal barriers to prevent women from acquiring political positions, while the 
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seventeen women who managed to acquire seats as councilors continued to face a lot of 
discrimination. Therefore, I am certain that it is political repression that prevented Saudi 
Arabian women from talking to me. At the beginning of my research process I did not 
expect I would encounter lack of cooperation; however, after discovering that Saudi 
Arabian women faced legal barriers in political participation, lack of cooperation no 
longer seemed surprising.  
Discovering Women’s Views 
Despite perceived risks, I was able to have four informal conversations that found 
their way to the pages of this thesis. To remain ethical, I will not include any personal 
identifiers that could jeopardize the confidentiality of my interviewees. The women 
indeed depicted bravery to provide me with information and share their own personal 
stories. All four women demanded recognition, services, and legal change from the state 
that could facilitate gender equality in the realms of politics, economics and social 
aspects. Three of the women I spoke to are students obtaining graduate degrees in the US, 
and one woman is an economist working in Saudi Arabia. Out of the four women I 
interviewed, only one is a political activist promoting women’s rights and equality in the 
economic sector. All four depict feminist consciousness, but are divided in regards to the 
source of Saudi Arabian women’s marginalization: some blame the state, while others 
blame the religious clergy. All women except one perceived women’s political 
participation in the Municipal Council elections as a first positive step towards better 
gender equality in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Lastly, the four women spoke fondly of 
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the former King Abdullah and accredited him as a women’s reformist. Three out of the 
four women I have interviewed participated in the national Municipal Council elections.  
An Economist. The first interview I conducted was on February 2, 2016 via 
FaceTime, and lasted for about ninety minutes. This was the only woman that responded 
to the Saudi Arabian celebrity’s introduction. In an email, she said:  
Dear Amal, please excuse my late response. I wish you all the best in your studies. 
Whereabouts do you live? You mentioned your school but I am not sure where that 
is… I am delighted to help in anyway I can. I will be in Riyadh for a conference 
tomorrow, maybe that day we could talk. Let me know what suits you. 
I immediately responded, and we exchanged numbers and had a FaceTime call the next 
day. This Saudi Arabian woman was particularly skeptical about the future of civil-
political rights, including women’s equality in the society. She was very informative in 
her discussion, providing me with information that was not yet reported or verified by 
Saudi Arabian or international media. For example, there were no accounts of the Jeddah 
incident across the Gulf newspapers, or leading international news agencies. Perhaps she 
held a most pessimistic view in regards to the future of the Kingdom. In her opinion, the 
Kingdom and women were better off under the former King Abdullah, who initiated 
women’s participation not just politically but also economically. When asked about her 
formal education and the education of her parents, she responded saying, “I hold an MA 
in Education which I acquired here in Saudi Arabia, both of my parents were educated.” 
When I asked her whether women need the real support of men to get ahead in society, 
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and if they do not have it, whether their activities and political participation would be 
limited, she argued:  
...For Saudi women to achieve something there ought to be “male – critical enabler” 
who would support women’s initiatives and advocate for change on their behalf. King 
Abdullah was one of such male enablers, along with the Prince al Walled bin Talal 
who financed such pro-women initiatives through lobbying.  
Then I inquired whether she believes that Saudi Arabian women today are more 
empowered in politics, economics, and social aspects than they were ten years ago. She 
responded with an example:  
… In early 1999, Saudi women that had some capital either from inheritance or 
personal savings were discouraged from engaging in commerce due to stringent legal 
barriers, despite of their numerous attempts. In order for a Saudi Arabian woman to 
start a business, she was first required to obtain legal attestation from the Ministry of 
Commerce located in the Chamber of the Commerce– an all male building. 
My interviewee said that in the absence of a women’s department in the Chamber of the 
Commerce due to strict policies of gender segregation, Saudi Arabian women were 
simply banned from entering the building. She then explained:  
...Saudi women either had to obtain legal permission by sending a male guardian to act 
on their behalf or were forced to open a business without legal documentation. The 
women that managed to obtain permission and open a business would further face 
discrimination from the male officers at the Chamber... They would refuse to provide 
services or would ignore the requests made by women. For example, Saudi 
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businesswomen would be left uninformed about the legal procedural amendments or 
business related regulations. But Saudi women-owned business increased throughout 
the Kingdom, recognizing the important economic benefit that these businesswomen 
brought about. In 2004, the government ordered a reform of the Chamber.  
According to this respondent, following the new decree for the first time a women’s 
department was established in the Chamber exclusively to aid women in 
entrepreneurship. The women’s department offered services such as entrepreneurial 
trainings, loans, and subsidies for businesses with deficient capital, administrative and 
legal work. The new economic opening provided Saudi Arabian women a niche within 
the economic sector in which they participated equally with men. 
Nevertheless, she said a majority of Saudi Arabian women were unable to pursue 
a profession in the economic sector because “they lacked financial capacity for 
entrepreneurship.” I also asked her, why highly educated Saudi Arabian women despite 
their skills and qualifications are unable to secure jobs. She replied: 
When Saudi government limits production to only one commodity – oil, there are no 
other industries that could account for employment. The youth that was sent out to 
Western nations on educational grants would come back to an increasing 
unemployment. 
Furthermore, this Saudi Arabian woman was skeptical about the Municipal 
Council elections. I asked, “What do you think prevents women from voting for female 
candidates?” She believed that low turnout from women was due to electoral barriers that 
were created in order to limit women’s participation. She said:  
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There were about 200 electoral polling stations installed across the Kingdom, however 
the time given for women to prepare the legal requirements prevented women from 
participation. Those who wished to participate in voting had to provide a proof of 
residency and show a property deed. 
Generally, these documents are under the disposal of male guardians, thus Saudi Arabian 
women’s low turnout could be a result of the government’s policy. In addition, she 
explained, “…Women lack knowledge in regards to electoral process and political 
participation, and this prompted many women to abstain from voting.”  
The interviewee also said that other factors further prevented women from 
competing in the elections. She said, “... Few competent, committed, and smart women... 
I personally know were unable to run because they did not have time to establish their 
campaign platform. Other women who did manage to compete lacked technical skills in 
relation to electoral campaign.” The 2015 elections resulted in seventeen women 
successfully securing seats out of 818 elected and 1636 total seats at the Municipal 
Councils. Some of the women representatives were faced with discrimination during their 
first Municipal Council meeting. She brought an example: 
... Specifically in Jeddah, male Councilors refused to sit at the table with women 
Councilors and demanded that women should be seated in a segregated room. Women 
Councilors objected to this discrimination arguing that the electorate rightfully elected 
them and therefore would remain seated at the same table with men based upon the 
principles of equality. The situation escalated to conflict, the unconvinced male 
Councilors lobbied the Minister of the Municipal and Rural Affairs to initiate a 
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regulation that would place women Councilors separate from men as per the national 
law of gender segregation. Today this law is applicable to all the Municipalities 
despite the fact that other regions did not face such an issue. 
Hence, in the view of this woman, “the hope that was once gained was lost again.” 
Despite political participation, women remain marginalized to the extent that they could 
not be seated in the same room with their male counterparts.  
My interviewee mentioned that it was important for Saudi Arabian women to be 
patient and to demand a gradual change by winning the support of  “critical male 
enablers” on the side of women. She argued, “...In Saudi society women’s equality in the 
political sphere could be gained through a gradual strategy like was implemented by the 
women advocating for equality in the economic sphere.” She shared her personal 
experience in support of her argument, stating that in 2011 a group of pro-women 
activists including her mobilized in front of the Industry and Commerce Chamber 
demanding to be present during the discussion of the members. Initially, they faced 
closed doors, but because they were persistent, i.e. they would show up every month in 
front of the building, eventually women were allowed to be present during discussions 
but in a segregated room. Later, these women attending the monthly sessions were even 
granted permission to ask questions or give suggestions, thus the meeting resembled a 
town hall open debate. Hence, she concluded that in order to achieve something in Saudi 
Arabian society, women ought to be patient and committed, because their commitment 
could eventually convince Saudi Arabian male enablers to take the stance of women.  
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Interestingly, this woman provided me with more in-depth information that made 
me wonder why out of the forty women I have been in touch with she was the only one 
speaking freely. I wondered whether this woman was fearless, or whether there was 
something else that I was not aware of. One explanation is that this woman was in some 
way related to royalty or at least protected by a royal figure. She spoke frankly and most 
of the information she brought up in our discussion was verifiable in existing records. 
However, I could not verify the information on the Jeddah Municipal Council incident. 
Lastly, while I thought I was investigating, maybe I myself was the subject of an 
investigation. She asked me many personal questions (where I am from, what did I do in 
the UAE, where my parents are from and where they lived). I spoke to this woman via a 
mobile phone application called WhatsApp. She was curious about the origins of my 
number (it was not a USA number. I explained that it was the UAE old number, which I 
retained to ensure I do not lose my old UAE contacts, and she seemed satisfied with this 
answer). She paid close attention to my research and asked why I was interested in the 
subject of Saudi Arabian women’s political participation. At that time I truly believed 
that the Kingdom had made a bold step forward. Saudi Arabia finally granted women the 
right to political participation. I thought that this would further lead to more freedoms for 
women, which made me an idealist, as I realized later.  
This woman was also willing to introduce me to about 30 of her contacts. She 
said:  
There are many young women I know of, who would want to speak to you and answer 
your questions, some of them were participating in the Municipal Council Elections, 
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some were prominent businesswomen. Send me your introductory brief through 
“WhatsApp” I will forwarded this to them. 
I did as she said, but did not get a message back from her until almost three months later. 
She reached out to me on May 8, 2016, asking how was my thesis proceeding. I told her 
that I changed my thesis topic because it was difficult to find many Saudi Arabian 
women willing to participate in the research. She said: “I am sorry to hear this but why 
did you not tell me? I could have helped you find as many contacts as you needed.” Well, 
I did reach out to her, and she was not helpful. Then she asked if I could send her my 
research topic. I basically forwarded the same email message I had sent her previously. It 
was strange that this woman contacted me again and I wondered, “What was her 
intention? What information was she getting?” 
Sciences Student. The second interview was conducted on March 5, 2016 via 
FaceTime for a duration of about forty-five minutes. This woman is pursuing a doctorate 
at a United States University. I was introduced to her through the referral made by my 
thesis advisor. This Saudi Arabian woman is married and lives with her two children, 
while her husband is receiving practical training as a medical doctor in Europe. I asked 
her what she intends to do after graduation and she said: “I want to go back to Saudi 
Arabia and work as a Professor in one of the Universities in Saudi Arabia.” When I asked 
her if her parents were educated, she said that they were not, and added that they were 
“very old.” In regards to the question asking about her political participation, the 
interviewee responded, “I did participate in the Municipal Council Elections, my relative 
was running for the elections… It was my duty to show full support regardless the 
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difficult electoral process.” I further inquired whether she herself would run in the future 
elections, and she eagerly said “why not?” She then added that she believes that more 
women ought to use this opportunity and run for elections in order to outnumber the men. 
“If you believe in gender equality then you should initiate the first steps to achieve it.” 
When asked if her family and husband would be supportive of her candidacy, she uttered 
with confidence that they would. She said that her husband is politically disengaged; she 
actually had to encourage him to cast a vote for her relative in the 2015 elections. She 
perceived the work of the Municipal Council elections as an important contributor that 
could facilitate both social and gender equality in the respective municipalities. “Having 
women representatives would foster accountability towards women electorate and 
promote issues related to health care, education and childcare.” I asked her about the 
driving scenario question, and she said she would not participate because it is illegal and 
may lead to unnecessary consequences. Although she loves to drive and she has a US 
driving license, she is willing to wait until women are granted the permission to drive in 
Saudi Arabia. She explained that being a mother she feels responsible, and even though 
she might get support from her family to drive, she would not have violated the law. She 
mentioned that she does feel safe as a woman in Saudi Arabia, with her family granting 
her the full support she needs. A few days after I spoke to her she contacted me and said: 
“During last call with you I really enjoy your questions and speaking, and I copied my 
friend, you can contact her, she is such a helpful girl.” I contacted her friend but she 
never responded.  
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Education Student. The third interview was conducted on March 13, 2016, via 
FaceTime, but lasted only twenty minutes. When asked, “What is your highest level of 
education, what degree? And what about your mother and father?” This woman 
answered, “I am pursuing a Masters in Education. While both of my parents were 
educated with Bachelor degrees from Saudi Arabian Universities, and my husband is 
currently a PhD candidate at a U.S. University.” She also mentioned that both of them are 
sponsored by the Saudi Arabian government’s scholarship fund. She mentioned that she 
voted during the Municipal Council elections because it was a big step in Saudi Arabian 
women’s achievement. When I inquired, “I would like to know about how your family 
supports your political participation?” She said: “I do not discuss political issues with my 
parents, because they are not interested, but I do talk about political issues with my 
husband. He supports me more, he did not object when I wanted to participate in the 
elections as a voter.” She also seemed a firm believer in women’s rights, but was very 
cautious. I asked her, “I would like you to imagine the scenario of a number of women 
deciding to drive in your country to protest the driving ban. How likely are you to join 
them and drive a car?” She explained, “Yes, I support the idea that Saudi women should 
drive because it would make our lives so much easier – but I myself will not participate 
in an open protest.” She explained that advocating for women’s inclusivity could lead to 
negative consequences not just for her but also for her family, and she refuses to place 
her family in such danger. When asked whether she feels that women need the real 
support of men to get ahead in society, she confirmed, saying: “… Saudi women need 
men for everything… you know we have this rule – we need permission from our male 
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guardians to go out, to work or to study.” When I inquired whether that rule impacts her 
activities, she said: “Not at all, I am very lucky, my father never objected to anything that 
I asked for, and now my husband as well supports me in my decisions. We have an 
understanding.”  
Sciences Student. The last interview was conducted on April 12, 2016 via 
FaceTime for about thirty minutes. I was introduced to this woman through a referral 
from a doctoral Saudi Arabian male student at the University of Denver. She perceived 
the Municipal Council elections in a negative light as an institution that reflected state 
sponsored policies with a lack of accountability and no independence. In her view, the 
mechanism for the selection of candidates is biased because candidates who are allowed 
to compete originate from wealthier Saudi Arabian families with connections to Saudi 
Arabian royalty. She believed that the Municipal Councils lack the capacity to initiate 
social change, and therefore could not foster women’s equality in the Kingdom. She said: 
“…The power of the councilors is advisory, one cannot expect that they would actually 
initiate a change in the policy.”  
Although this woman did not participate in the elections, she is an activist for 
women’s rights. Mainly, she thinks Saudi Arabian women ought to be allowed to drive in 
Saudi Arabia because it would provide women with employment opportunities and 
therefore would foster women’s financial independence. She administers a weblog that 
campaigns against the “women’s driving ban.” On her blog, other Saudi Arabian women 
express their support for the campaign through comments. When asked about the driving 
scenario question, she stated that she would not hesitate to join other women in protest 
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against the “driving ban.” She further explained that she was taught to drive by her father 
when she was sixteen, and both her father and her brothers support her advocacy against 
the Saudi Arabian women’s driving ban. However, her mother disapproves of her online 
activism because she fears for her daughter’s reputation. She mentioned that whenever 
she goes back to Saudi Arabia for holidays, she tends to teach her young siblings to drive 
in the backyard. When asked if she would consider her family conservative, she said, 
“…Not at all, both of my parents are open minded, they fully support me in all my 
decisions… it is just my mom sometimes gets worried…” Then I added, “I would like to 
know about how your family supports your decisions. Can you give an example of how 
your parents support you?” She said: 
Well you know I live all by myself, while my brother who is my actual guardian lives 
on his own in another state. I can do whatever I want… he does not care. I travel a lot 
around the US visiting my friends. My parents know they do not mind for as long as I 
stay safe. 
When she knew that I lived in the UAE, she said, “… I will come visit you, hopefully by 
then we will be allowed to drive, so I can actually drive through the border… I did 
before.” For the last question, “It is sometimes suggested that women need the real 
support of men to get ahead in the society. If they do not have it, their activities and 
political participation will be limited,” she answered, “… There is no question that in 
order to achieve something in Saudi society women needs the help of men. If there is no 
such help, then women will not even speak out.” In the future, she hopes to acquire a 
PhD, however after graduating with her master’s degree she must return to Saudi Arabia 
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to teach in one of the Universities in fulfillment of the two-year government’s contract. 
She also mentioned that although she wishes that Saudi Arabian women were freer, she 
does not believe it will happen in the near future.  
Summary 
I was able to speak to just four Saudi Arabian women, which does not constitute a 
sample, and the responses I received from these Saudi Arabian women were very similar: 
all four believe that education is the first aspect that leads to women’s equality and 
empowerment in the Kingdom. Education also creates job security for Saudi Arabian 
women. For instance, the three women students were all studying outside of Saudi Arabia 
on government sponsored scholarships. Employment opportunities in the Kingdom are 
low, but the scholarship grants each recipient a contract for employment in one of the 
Kingdom’s universities. In general, all four women strive for gender equality, and view 
the political participation of women as necessary for women’s empowerment, but only a 
few are ready to speak critically about policies of discrimination that the Kingdom 
unfairly imposes. Only three of these women participated in the Municipal Council 
election voting in 2015, and perceived it as a first step towards gender equality. They also 
believed that this opportunity was important for Saudi Arabian women as it encouraged 
women’s participation in the political arena, which before was accessible only to men. 
Only one woman criticized the Municipal Council elections because she questioned the 
transparency and accountability of the system. She perceived that only well-off 
candidates were able to stand in the elections, and that once voted into the office such 
women candidates would not necessarily advance women’s rights in the country because 
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their power is limited. Therefore, all four women did recognize that their political 
participation is limited in the country; however, one can overcome such limits through 
the male critical enablers and patience. In Saudi Arabian society women need the help of 
men to achieve almost everything; hence, women ought to win the support of these 
critical men. One such example was the King Abdullah, who was seen by these Saudi 
Arabian women as a pro-women reformist.  
Out of the four interviews, only one interviewee spoke negatively about the 
government, while the others were more silent on the issue of the government. This is 
due to the fact that repressive governments do not tolerate opposing views; those who 
express such views serve as political prisoners. In Saudi Arabia the government 
criminalizes political dissent, hence one is safe by not presenting views on politics 
publically. The “driving ban scenario” question showed some indication that Saudi 
Arabian women were afraid to participate in nonviolent protests to express their 
dissatisfaction about a discriminatory policy. Two women justified their unwillingness to 
participate: one feared it would lead to dangerous consequences for her family, while the 
other felt that it was illegal and violation of the law which could imply penalties. It is no 
secret that in the past, when pro-women’s rights activists violated societal norms that 
reinforced gender discrimination and gender stereotypes, the state reacted with 
repression. These women activists not only received arbitrary detention, but also often 
were treated unfairly by the society after serving prison sentences. In Saudi Arabian 
society women could be subjected to harsh social stigmatization, which may impede 
women’s reputations and honor. Hence, because risks are so high, the majority of Saudi 
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Arabian women conform to the system and choose to remain passive in regards to 
political or civil rights. They would rather wait for political opening, hoping that it will 
lead to a change in their social status. 
 Consequently, one interviewee who did mention that she would participate in the 
driving ban protest recognized the risks, and deemed it dangerous. Only one woman 
admitted her willingness to participate in political discussion against discriminatory laws 
and raising concerns via the Internet. In the example of one of my interviewees who runs 
a blog against the women’s driving ban, she mentioned that the Internet provides “a space 
for women’s voices.” She then added that there are many Saudi Arabians who are active 
in her blog and support her initiative. This is in support of the theory of political 
participation, which stresses that women may feel safe to demand their political rights 
through unconventional means of political participation, but they cannot yet do so 
through direct means. Perhaps the political participation of Saudi Arabian women 
remains limited due to fear of political repression.  
Political repression is evident in the Kingdom, because women’s rights activists 
are still struggling to achieve greater equality to end discrimination. The regime in the 
past has cracked pro-women rights movements, harassing the activists and preventing 
them from forming an opposition movement. Hence, the Saudi Arabian government’s use 
of repression has resulted in a culture of fear. My encounters with forty Saudi Arabian 
women demonstrates these effects: women are not ready to share political opinions 
simply because they are not free to express their views, and they fear the consequences. 
The Saudi Arabian government does not tolerate freedom of expression because it 
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perceives such freedom to be threatening to political stability, as different political ideas 
may lead to the development of regime dissidents. If the government allowed citizens to 
freely express their views, then Saudi Arabian women would be more cooperative and 
willing to talk to international researchers. Through dialogue there could be an 
improvement; by brining in international awareness, Saudi Arabian women may achieve 
their aspirations for women’s rights and equality. Political activism of Saudi Arabian 
women – i.e. voicing their concerns and spreading awareness about the status of women’s 
rights and equality – pushed the government to initiate political reforms due to unwanted 
international oversight. However, only Saudi Arabian women would truly know the 
effects of the new political space, hence Saudi Arabian women ought to be asked to 
capture their sense of freedoms so as to evaluate the impact of the 2015 elections. Thus it 
is absolutely necessary that Saudi Arabian women cooperate and participate in such 
research inquiries because only through attaining a voice can they acquire greater 
freedom. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
Findings 
The original purpose of this thesis was to find out whether recent political space 
granted to Saudi Arabian women through the government’s initiation enhanced women’s 
political participation in the Kingdom. My focus was to learn the views and attitudes of 
Saudi Arabian women towards the new political opening, whether women felt that they 
had acquired greater equality and rights in the society. My intention was to get a sense of 
what the 2015 Municipal Council elections meant for Saudi Arabian women – whether it 
granted Saudi Arabian women political space for voicing their concerns and issues. I 
sought to conduct interviews with Saudi Arabian women activists because I was 
interested in their opinions. This seemed an opportune time to carry out such discussions 
because I was confident that Saudi Arabian women would be eager to share their personal 
experiences, life stories, and opinions in light of the 2015 elections.  
The next step was to find Saudi Arabian women who would agree to participate in 
my research study. Many expressed an initial interest in my research topic. However, 
later these women refused to participate in an interview. Out of forty contacts I was in 
touch with, I have managed to obtain interviews with just four Saudi Arabian women. 
Most of the women I contacted did not respond to my research queries. Some women 
expressed their eagerness and interest in participating, but later were not responsive to my 
numerous follow up email messages. A few have explained that they could not participate 
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in research that probes for political opinion. Others were willing to participate, but only 
through a questionnaire because they wanted to remain completely anonymous and not 
disclose their identities to me. 
An important question emerges: why are Saudi Arabian women interested in the 
subject, but unwilling to engage in open discussion on the subject? I reached the 
conclusion that most Saudi Arabian women respondents were afraid to express their 
views. These women did not interpret the right of freedom of speech as a part of the 
political change that occurred when the Kingdom decided to allow women the right to 
vote and stand as candidates for the Municipal Elections. From my analysis, I concluded 
that Saudi Arabian women were not free to share their thoughts, opinions, and attitudes in 
relation to recent political space because such space was limited. They felt constrained to 
express and share their attitudes.  
The literature on political repression asserts that authoritarian governments 
implement limited political reforms in order to control citizens’ political participation. 
Concessions are made because the state perceives such concessions as unthreatening for 
the internal stability, and in reality concessions do not grant citizens any actual power by 
which they could influence the decision-making process. The authoritarian state often 
chooses to promote women’s inclusivity in the political realm because they do not view 
women’s political participation as a threat. Women, when granted political positions, 
depict a low level of political power because their participation is under the direct 
scrutiny of the authoritarian regime. Therefore, granting political space to women cannot 
be equated to granting political and civil liberties, as women although able to participate 
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may be unable to influence the political apparatus. A repressive government frowns upon 
citizens’ political participation, and when political concessions are initiated these remain 
restricted in order to maintain control over the population. Hence, Saudi Arabian women 
are afraid to speak out against certain discriminating policies because it may entail 
negative consequences and government retaliation. In the view of Saudi Arabian women, 
political participation is slow and a gradual process. Based on my research, I can 
conclude that some Saudi Arabian women would rather chose to live with oppression and 
hope for the improvement of their social status in the future, while others do not aspire 
for women’s equality and rights in the society because they adhere to the state’s 
sponsored political culture and do not consider themselves oppressed. Only a handful of 
women are willing to take drastic initiatives to demand political, economic, and social 
change through participation, and that is through the realm of the Internet, which may be 
a way to avoid the risks associated with political repression in a context of authoritarian 
regimes.  
In a non-democratic regime citizens are reluctant to voice their political opinions 
and express their dissatisfaction openly; this silence is projected upon them by a regime 
that is unaccountable towards citizens’ rights. In Saudi Arabia, there were clear signs of 
citizens’ political activism expressed by the use of unconventional means of political 
participation, i.e., Saudi Arabian women attempting to facilitate a change towards 
women’s rights and equality through indirect participation (Internet activism and 
violations of the driving ban). Yet in my efforts to inquire about Saudi Arabian women’s 
sense of political participation and freedoms, despite the numerous attempts I made to 
 124 
contact them, I almost always-encountered “silence,” as Saudi Arabian women were 
hesitant to speak to me. I followed a method of chain referral that ought to facilitate the 
possibility of responses, yet I was still unable to get answers.  
Although it is not certain what this silence entails, if it means a deliberate 
inhibition to express one’s views to seek recognition and respect for such views, then 
there ought to be a reason for one’s total silence. If citizens in a non-democratic regime 
are voiceless and are prevented from expressing their own views – whether such views 
are in favor or against the current status quo – then such a society is not free. I only 
obtained four distinctive interviews, all from educated Saudi Arabian women, and only 
one could be considered an activist for women’s rights in Saudi Arabia, while the other 
three were students at U.S. universities. Therefore, silence could also mean that when 
occasional people decide to voice their views in a non-democratic system, one cannot be 
certain whether these people are genuine outliers who take risks, or planted 
spokespersons. Expression of one’s voice and opinion is an example of citizens’ political 
participation by which citizens could foster a change in a governmental policy, or 
reinforce the status quo. Having a voice enables citizens to express their positions in 
relation to the incumbent regime. Voice can facilitate political activism and political 
freedoms, because through voice the incumbent’s accountability is obtained, while 
silence will almost always undermine political accountability and freedoms.  
Contribution of Study  
 This thesis contributes to the study of political participation in the context of 
authoritarian systems, emphasizing that political concessions granted by authoritarian 
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rulers remain limited in scope and cannot be equated to political freedoms. Citizens’ 
aspirations for political participation almost always remain curtailed by an authoritarian 
state’s use of political repression. In theory political participation is a broad concept by 
which citizens’ political activism is expressed and used to exert pressure upon the 
political elites in order to push them to take action or initiate a change in a governmental 
policy. Political participation is important because it generates accountability of political 
elites towards the citizens. In democratic societies, citizens are not constrained in political 
participation. They use both direct and indirect means in expression of political activism. 
Citizens routinely criticize government policies, speak openly about their views, and are 
not afraid to voice their opinions, even to random strangers. However, in a non-
democratic political setting such criticisms are often suppressed and discouraged because 
citizens fear negative consequences from their government, and avoid taking risks in 
participation. The only channel remaining for citizens to be able to express political 
views in such settings is through ways where they may not face punishment, i.e., via the 
Internet. Although the Internet realm provides citizens with a means to voice their 
concerns and political dissatisfaction, in the context of non-democratic regimes the 
influence of such participation is minimal due to the culture of unaccountability that 
defines the essence of such regimes. In the course of my study, I found that Saudi 
Arabian women were reluctant to engage in open discussion of political participation, 
women’s rights, and freedoms – unlike what would be expected in a democratic system. 
My encounters with Saudi Arabian women and their continuous silence confirmed what 
theories on political repression described, especially in relation to a Sultanistic form of 
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governance. My study offers some empirical support for citizens’ political behavior in the 
context of authoritarian regimes that condemn citizens’ aspirations for political freedoms 
and political participation. 
 Political repression inhibits citizens’ participation because those individuals 
dissatisfied with the policies of the repressive state choose to remain silent and refrain 
from openly confronting the state, fearing the consequences. In the course of my inquiry I 
found that Saudi Arabian women chose to be silent and conform to the state’s policies 
that reinforce women’s marginalization and inequality in the society. Even though many 
had initially expressed a strong interest in my research that seemed to indicate they may 
have wanted to voice their views, on second thought they decided not to do so. To initiate 
a change women must overcome the political barriers enforced by a repressive state, but 
women cannot overcome these barriers when they refrain from voicing their concerns. 
Therefore, the findings confirm that political repression reinforces the political status quo 
and restrains citizens’ political participation.  
Limitations of Study 
The sensitivity of the topic could be a potential inhibitor in women’s participation 
in the research study. Saudi Arabian women are not yet ready to speak openly and 
honestly about political issues because the government of Saudi Arabia imposes 
censorship upon citizens’ expression of political speech – views and opinions underlining 
political context. However, political culture could be another potential inhibitor that 
prevented women from participating in the research study. There are many Saudi Arabian 
women who remain politically disengaged or disinterested because they are satisfied with 
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the current status quo. Hence, Saudi Arabian women’s silence could be the result of 
political disinterest and disengagement. When tradition, culture and religious 
interpretations designate women as only having “natural” obligations women simply 
remain silent and passive towards politics. Perhaps these women viewed my interest in 
the political participation of Saudi Arabian women as a threat to the genuine culture of 
Saudi Arabia, and perceived me as another foreign researcher who is interested in 
diffusing Saudi Arabian religious and cultural percepts with Western ideals. In short, the 
lack of cooperation from Saudi Arabian women greatly restricted what conclusions I may 
draw about this study. Although my study incorporates four distinctive interviews, this is 
negligible because conclusions could not be drawn from such a small sample. I cannot 
know for certain how representative the views of the four women were, how truthful 
were these responses, or whether they were extreme or average. I do know, however, that 
many political scientists interested in the women’s question have also faced lack of 
cooperation from Saudi Arabian women when administering their interviews.  
Perhaps another important limitation of my study was my own extensive reliance 
on the information obtained from one single outspoken woman, and the validity of 
information obtained from this particular source is highly questionable. I cannot know for 
a fact that the information she provided me with was genuine. In the course of the 
research process, I myself could not remain dispassionate towards the topic inquiry. As 
mentioned earlier, I am a strong advocate for women’s political participation and 
women’s rights. My own biases towards my topic inquiry inhibited the neutrality of the 
research. Throughout the research investigation I hoped that the recent political opening 
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has initiated a positive impact upon Saudi Arabian women, enhancing their social, 
political and economic status in the Kingdom.  
Finding and locating potential Saudi Arabian women participants was another 
limitation of my research. I was interested in conducting interviews with Saudi Arabian 
women political activists, and in a non-democratic regime that enforces legal barriers in 
order to curtail citizen’s political aspirations, political activists tend to lay low or remain 
involved in underground (i.e. secret) participation because they fear the consequences of 
an open confrontation. Hence, I encountered difficulties in finding women political 
activists who were willing to talk to me openly. In sum, research sensitivity, political 
culture, small sample, over reliance on a single source, and a specific pool of participants 
were limitations in my approach in getting a sense of either of these concepts – women’s 
political participation and political culture and political repression.   
Future Research 
In the course of my research study I witnessed a lack of cooperation from Saudi 
Arabian women, and this inhibited the inferential quality of my analysis because I was 
not able to capture diversity of views. The sensitivity of the topic could be an inhibiting 
factor that led to a lack of cooperation. Therefore, future research ought to neutralize the 
questions in order to eliminate topic sensitivity. Another aspect that could enhance Saudi 
Arabian women’s cooperation with the research is improving contacting efforts. 
Although Saudi Arabian women are approachable, they are not willing to disclose 
information about political issues because the government of Saudi Arabia bans freedom 
of speech. In addition, political culture curtails women’s aspirations for gender equality 
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and rights in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian political culture has 
accustomed women to a culture of silence; women are treated as legal minors with no 
power of voice. Hence, in Saudi Arabia when both conservative and liberal women aspire 
to have a voice, they do so in the realm of Internet. Saudi Arabian women are active in 
the realm of the Internet; therefore, targeting these individuals in particular would 
increase cooperation in the research. The Internet has opened doors for Saudi Arabian 
women’s voices; a lot of women participate in online political discussions, therefore 
locating these participants would yield an increase in cooperation. To acquire women’s 
views and opinions to get sense of women’s political participation, researchers could 
contact Saudi Arabian women web bloggers, online journalists, commentators and 
novelists. The rate of refusals in participation could be substantially decreased if 
researchers approach Saudi Arabian women active in Internet political participation. In 
conclusion, to acquire a greater level of cooperation and participation, Saudi Arabian 
women ought to be asked; i.e., interviews are the only path for information. Women’s 
views are important because without the input of women, one cannot know what 
women’s political participation entails, and how it may inhibit women’s rights and 
equality in society.  
                                                 
  Appendix list of emails is available from author upon request.  
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